

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION)	CASE NO. PAC-E-24-04
OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER FOR)	
AUTHORITY TO INCREASE ITS RATES)	DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
AND CHARGES IN IDAHO AND)	RAMON J. MITCHELL
APPROVAL OF PROPOSED)	REDACTED
ELECTRIC SERVICE SCHEDULES AND)	
REGULATIONS)	

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

CASE NO. PAC-E-24-04

May 2024

1 I. INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS

2 Q. Please state your name, business address, and present
3 position with PacifiCorp d/b/a Rocky Mountain Power (the
4 "Company").

5 A. My name is Ramon J. Mitchell, and my business address is
6 825 NE Multnomah Street, Suite 600, Portland, Oregon
7 97232. My title is Manager, Net Power Costs.

8 Q. Please describe your education and professional
9 experience.

10 A. I received a Master of Business Administration degree
11 from the University of Portland and a Bachelor of Arts
12 degree in Economics from Reed College. I was first
13 employed by the Company in 2015 and during my time at
14 the Company I have held various positions in the
15 regulation, merchant, and transmission departments.
16 After a brief departure from the Company, in 2022 I
17 returned to the Company as Manager, Net Power Costs. In
18 my current role I am responsible for leading and
19 overseeing various efforts associated with the Company's
20 net power costs filings.

21 Q. Have you testified in previous regulatory proceedings?

22 A. Yes. I have previously provided testimony to the public
23 utility commissions in California, Oregon, Washington,
24 and Wyoming.

II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY

Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?

A. My testimony presents the Company’s proposed net power costs (“NPC”) for the 12-month forecast period ending December 31, 2025 (“NPC test period”); and proposes changes to the annual Energy Cost Adjustment Mechanism (“ECAM”) to update the sharing band. The proposed NPC would become the new base NPC for the ECAM, beginning January 1, 2025. Specifically, my testimony:

- Supports removing Renewable Energy Credit (“REC”) adjustments from the ECAM;
- Discusses Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) Order No. 898 which moves certain costs from FERC account 555 to FERC account 509;
- Provides detail on the NPC component of the Company’s rate mitigation proposal, which will ease financial burdens on the Company’s customers;
- Summarizes forecasted NPC for the 2025 NPC test period in this general rate case (“GRC”) and explains the calculation of NPC using the Company’s Aurora production cost model;
- Explains the primary drivers behind the increase in NPC compared to the current base NPC approved by the Commission and incorporated into customer rates in the Company’s last general rate case, Case No. PAC-E-21-07¹ (“2021 GRC”), which includes a discussion of extraordinary increases in regional wholesale electricity (power) and natural gas fuel (gas) market prices since the 2021 GRC;

¹ *In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to Increase its Rates and Charges in Idaho and Approval of Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Regulations*, Case No. PAC-E-21-07, Order No. 35277 (Dec. 30, 2021).

- 1 • Describes new policy changes and operations changes
2 since the 2021 GRC that substantially impact NPC;
- 3 • Describes modeling changes the Company has made to
4 improve the NPC forecast accuracy since the 2021
5 GRC; and
- 6 • Proposes updating the ECAM sharing band considering
7 the Company's pending participation in a complete
8 organized market along with observations on trends
9 in western markets since the inception of the
10 current sharing band in 2009.

11 **Q. Is there a summary of the proposed ECAM Base amounts to**
12 **be set in this filing for future ECAM filings?**

13 A. Yes. Exhibit No. 51 attached to the testimony of Company
14 witness Shelley M. McCoy, summarizes the proposed base
15 amounts for all elements for ECAM deferrals beginning
16 January 1, 2025. In addition to NPC discussed in my
17 testimony, the ECAM deferral includes the difference
18 between actual and base amounts for production tax
19 credits, and load change adjustment revenues.

20 **Q. How is the testimony organized?**

21 A. In section II, I first present the Company's proposal to
22 adjust the ECAM to remove REC adjustments and I discuss
23 FERC Order No. 898. I then provide an overview of the
24 NPC forecast for the 2025 NPC test period. This overview
25 includes a high-level discussion of the NPC changes
26 since the 2021 GRC followed by a more detailed discussion
27 of the individual NPC components along with narrative

1 explanations which touch on the impacts associated with
2 new policy and operations changes.

3 Next, Section III includes a discussion on the
4 reasonableness of the NPC forecast and section IV
5 explores in detail the drivers of regional forward power
6 market prices and regional forward fuel prices which
7 account for the majority of the change in the NPC
8 forecast since the 2021 GRC.

9 Section V discusses in detail new policy and
10 operations changes, along with the numeric impacts to
11 the NPC forecast that each change represents.

12 In Section VI, I discuss the transition from the
13 Generation and Regulation Initiative Decision Tools
14 production cost model ("GRID") to the Aurora production
15 cost model ("Aurora") for the forecast of NPC, then in
16 Section VII, I present and discuss changes to improve
17 modeling accuracy along with the numeric impacts to the
18 NPC forecast that each improvement represents.

19 In section VIII I transition the discussion to the
20 proposed NPC forecast based on 2023 weather normalized
21 load.

22 Finally, after the NPC portion of my testimony, I
23 transition into a discussion on NPC recovery in the ECAM,
24 in section IX.

1 **Q. Please describe the proposed change in the ECAM related**
2 **to RECs.**

3 A. The Company is proposing to remove the REC revenue
4 adjustment from the annual ECAM calculation. As
5 described in Company witness Craig M. Eller's testimony,
6 the Company is proposing a new voluntary REC option
7 tariff. Company witness McCoy addresses the Company's
8 proposed adjustments to the revenue requirement in this
9 case to facilitate the REC option tariff and Company
10 witness Robert M. Meredith introduces the proposed
11 tariff Electric Service Schedule No. 98 - REC Revenue
12 Adjustment ("RRA"). Since REC revenue would now be
13 passed back to customers through proposed tariff
14 Electric Service Schedule No. 98, the REC revenue
15 adjustment would no longer be included in the ECAM.

16 **Q. Please describe the movement of costs from FERC account**
17 **555 to FERC account 509.**

18 A. On June 29, 2023, the FERC issued Order No. 898 (Docket
19 No. RM21-11-000),² Accounting and Reporting Treatment of
20 Certain Renewable Energy Assets, to change the
21 accounting required for certain types of costs that have
22 been previously booked to FERC Account 555 to be booked

² *File Rule*, 183 FERC ¶ 61,205, Docket No. RM21-11-000 (Jun. 29, 2023)
available at <https://www.ferc.gov/media/order-no-898>.

1 to FERC account 509. This change becomes effective on
2 January 1, 2025.

3 **Q. What costs will be affected by FERC's Order No. 898**
4 **beginning January 1, 2025?**

5 A. The change in accounting affects the costs associated
6 with greenhouse gas ("GHG") allowances that have been
7 historically booked to FERC account 555. Specifically
8 for NPC, California GHG costs and Washington GHG costs
9 will be booked to FERC account 509, beginning January 1,
10 2025. Correspondingly, for those costs which would have
11 been recovered from FERC account 555, the Company
12 advises that they will now be recovered from FERC account
13 509.

14 **Q. Please provide detail on the NPC component of the**
15 **Company's proposed rate mitigation proposal.**

16 A. The Company proposes to phase in the increase to the
17 base ECAM across two years, with the ability to recover
18 100 percent of any ECAM variance up to and no further
19 than the Company's proposed ECAM forecast. The proposed
20 ECAM forecast on a dollar per megawatt hour (\$/MWh) basis
21 is \$39.34/MWh and the ECAM base currently in rates is
22 \$24.54/MWh. The rate mitigation proposal in this context
23 would phase in the proposed ECAM through two steps by
24 increasing the base from \$24.54/MWh to \$31.94/MWh on
25 January 1, 2025, and then increasing the base from

1 \$31.94/MWh to \$39.34/MWh on January 1, 2026. As part of
2 this phase-in across the two years, the Company proposes
3 that the ECAM sharing band would only apply to ECAM
4 variances above \$39.34/MWh or below \$24.54/MWh, with 100
5 percent recovery of ECAM variances between the
6 \$24.54/MWh base and the \$39.34/MWh forecast. Company
7 witness Joelle R. Steward discusses this proposal in
8 further detail.

9 **Q. Please explain the components of the Company's NPC.**

10 A. NPC are defined as the sum of fuel expenses, wholesale
11 purchased power expenses, allowances, and wheeling
12 expenses, less wholesale sales revenue. The NPC forecast
13 approved in this case becomes the base NPC used for
14 comparison to actual NPC in the Company's annual ECAM
15 filings.

16 **Q. Please explain how the Company calculates NPC.**

17 A. NPC are calculated for the forecast NPC test period based
18 on projected data using Aurora, which simulates the
19 operation of the Company's power system on an hourly
20 basis. The production cost model respects all system
21 requirements and constraints and commits and dispatches
22 the Company's resources for an NPC-minimizing output
23 where demand and supply are balanced.

1 **Q. Which version of Aurora was used to prepare this initial**
2 **filing?**

3 A. The Aurora version used to prepare this initial filing
4 was version 14.2.1059.³ No other version of Aurora is
5 assured to be able to identically reproduce the NPC
6 proposal in this initial filing. This - and all - Aurora
7 versions are available upon request from Energy Exemplar
8 provided that a license agreement is in place that allows
9 utilization of the software.

10 **Q. What Aurora inputs were updated for this filing?**

11 A. All inputs have been updated since the 2021 GRC,
12 including system load, reserves, wholesale sales and
13 purchase contracts for electricity, natural gas and
14 wheeling, market prices for electricity and natural gas
15 also known as the official forward price curve ("OFPC"),
16 fuel expenses, transmission topology, and the
17 characteristics and availability of the Company's
18 generation facilities.

19 **Q. Did the Company update regulation reserves for this**
20 **filing?**

21 A. Yes, consistent with the prior GRC, the Company has
22 updated regulation reserves to be aligned with the

³ Specifically, Aurora version 14.2.1059 released on May 23, 2023.

1 recent integrated resource plan's ("IRP") flexible
2 reserve study.⁴

3 **Q. What is the date of the OFPC the Company used for its**
4 **forecast NPC?**

5 A. The forecast for 2025 NPC uses the OFPC dated March 29,
6 2024.

7 **Q. What reports do the Aurora model produce?**

8 A. The major output from the Aurora model is the NPC report,
9 which is attached to my testimony as Exhibit No. 23.

10 **Q. What is the proposed total-Company NPC for the 2025 NPC**
11 **test period?**

12 A. Under 2023 weather normalized load conditions, the
13 proposed NPC for the 2025 NPC test period is \$2.382
14 billion, or \$39.19/MWh, on a total-Company basis; or
15 \$136.7 million, or \$39.34/MWh on an Idaho-allocated
16 basis.

17 However, for narrative accuracy, the following
18 testimony provides NPC analyses **based upon an NPC**
19 **forecast using expected NPC test period load (i.e., 2025**
20 **forecast load), unless otherwise noted.** Then, at the end
21 of my testimony a final adjustment is made to bring NPC
22 in line with 2023 weather normalized load.

⁴ See PacifiCorp 2021 Integrated Resource Plan, Appendix F and PacifiCorp 2023 Integrated Resource Plan, Appendix F.

1 Under 2025 load forecast conditions, NPC for the
2 2025 NPC test period are \$2.651 billion, or \$39.83/MWh,
3 on a total-Company basis. Unless otherwise noted,
4 references to NPC or various individual cost items
5 throughout my testimony are stated in total-Company
6 system amounts.

7 **Q. Please explain the changes in 2025 NPC as compared to**
8 **the 2021 NPC forecasted in the 2021 GRC.**

9 A. Using the 2023 weather normalized NPC forecast to
10 compare to the 2021 GRC, which was also weather
11 normalized, the changes to NPC on a total-Company basis
12 are illustrated below in Table 'NPC Variance Between
13 GRCs' and the associated energy changes on a total-
14 Company basis are illustrated below in Table 'Energy
15 Variance Between GRCs'. Below, I expand on the
16 individual line items.

Table NPC Variance Between GRCs

Net Power Cost Reconciliation (\$)		
	(\$ millions)	\$/MWh
ID 2021 GRC Final Forecast	1,368	23.41
Increase/(Decrease) to NPC:		
Wholesale Sales Revenue	(201.7)	
Purchased Power Expense	386.4	
Coal Fuel Expense	77.4	
Natural Gas Fuel Expense	308.2	
Wheeling and Other Expense	<u>39.6</u>	
Total Increase/(Decrease) to NPC	1013.4	
ID 2024 GRC Initial Forecast	<u>2,382</u>	39.19

Table Energy Variance Between GRCs

Net Power Cost Reconciliation (MWh)		
	MWh	\$/MWh
ID 2021 GRC Final Forecast	58,444,451	23.41
Change to Net System Load:		
Wholesale Sales Decrease	(7,334,748)	
Purchased Power Increase	1,862,120	
Coal Generation Decrease	(8,838,653)	
Natural Gas Generation Increase	3,580,407	
Other Generation Decrease	<u>(1,594,690)</u>	
Total Change to Net System Load	2,343,932	
ID 2025 GRC Initial	<u>60,788,384</u>	39.19

1 **Q. Please explain the increase in purchased power expense.**

2 A. The purchased power expense increases in tandem with
3 power market prices supplemented by increased purchased
4 power volumes due to: (1) reduced coal supply
5 availability in Utah; (2) the decrease in generation at
6 the Chehalis plant due to the Washington Cap and Invest
7 Program ("WA-GHG"); and (3) lower hydroelectric
8 generation driven by the deconstruction/removal of
9 Klamath River hydroelectric facilities. I explain these
10 individual drivers in more detail below.

11 **Q. Please explain the increase in coal fuel expense and the**
12 **increase in natural gas fuel expense.**

13 A. The coal fuel expense increases due to coal fuel price
14 increases which result from increased domestic
15 competition for limited coal supply. Some of the coal
16 fuel expense is offset by: (1) coal supply challenges,
17 which decrease the amount of generation at certain coal
18 facilities; and (2) the gas conversion of Jim Bridger
19 units 1 and 2, which removes two generating units from
20 the coal fuel expense category. Natural gas fuel expense
21 increases due to: (1) the gas conversion of Jim Bridger
22 units 1 and 2, which adds two generating units into the
23 natural gas fuel expense category; and (2) increased
24 dispatch of natural gas units to meet load and reserve
25 obligations. Natural gas fuel expense also increases in

1 tandem with natural gas market prices.

2 **Q. Please explain the decrease in wholesale sales revenue**
3 **and the increase in wheeling and other expense.**

4 A. With decreased net generation, wholesale sales volumes
5 also decrease. Wheeling expenses increase relative to
6 the forecast in the 2021 GRC based on increases in the
7 historical wheeling expenses supporting recent actual
8 purchased power volumes.

9 **Q. Please summarize the overall changes.**

10 A. The overall changes are driven by: 1) the NPC under-
11 forecast in the 2021 GRC; and 2) increases in purchased
12 power and natural gas fuel expense that result from
13 increased power and natural gas commodity prices, a
14 reduction in generation due to the WA-GHG program, the
15 expectation of lower hydroelectric generation resulting
16 from the deconstruction of hydroelectric facilities
17 along the Klamath River, and coal supply challenges.

18 **III. NPC VALIDATION**

19 **Q As an initial matter, please discuss the 2021 NPC**
20 **forecast from the prior GRC.**

21 A The prior GRC forecasted NPC of \$1.368 billion total-
22 Company for calendar year 2021. Actual total-Company NPC
23 for calendar year 2021 were \$1.715 billion. Therefore,
24 the prior GRC's NPC was a \$347 million total-Company
25 under-forecast for the 2021 NPC test period.

1 Q. Is \$2.651 billion a reasonable forecast for total-
2 Company 2025 NPC using 2025 load expectations?

3 A. Yes. Calendar year 2023 actual NPC are \$2.555 billion.
4 In 2025, as compared to 2023:

5 (1) At the total-Company level, 2025 forecast NPC
6 are \$2.651 billion, or \$39.83/MWh while 2023 actual
7 NPC are \$2.555 billion, or \$41.26/MWh. On a dollar
8 basis, NPC increase by 3.7 percent, **however** on a
9 \$/MWh basis, NPC **decrease** by 3.5 percent;

10 (2) 2025 Pacific Northwest summer and winter peak
11 power prices **increase** by 18 percent and Desert
12 Southwest summer and winter peak power prices
13 **increase** by 9 percent;

14 (3) 2025 Pacific Northwest summer and winter natural
15 gas prices **increase** by 54 percent and Rocky
16 Mountain region summer and winter natural gas
17 prices **increase** by 21 percent (both calculations
18 excluding the anomalous January 2023 price
19 excursion);⁵ and

20 (4) Although new Company-owned \$0/MWh marginal cost
21 wind is estimated to produce 1.1 million megawatt-
22 hours ("MWh") more at the total-Company level, as
23 compared to 2023; load increases by 4.7 million MWh
24 at the total-Company level, as compared to 2023,
25 and completely absorbs that increased wind
26 production. After subtracting the new Company owned
27 wind generation increase, the remaining load
28 increase is 3.6 million MWh.

29 These fundamentals indicate that 2025 total-Company
30 NPC will be higher than 2023 total-Company NPC. All else
31 equal, the remaining load increase valued at the average

⁵ The Company excluded the outlier data from January 2023 because inclusion of that anomalous price spike skews the comparison of 2023 to 2025 data. However, in the interest of complete analysis for the record, from 2023 to 2025, *January* natural gas prices in the Pacific Northwest and in the Rocky Mountain region decreased by 31 percent and 56 percent, respectively.

1 NPC of \$39.83/MWh suggests that 2025 NPC should be an
2 increase of \$142 million relative to 2023 NPC. This
3 implied increase is a conservative estimate given that
4 load increases are more likely to be fulfilled by market
5 purchases rather than the pre-existing generation mix.
6 From this basic analysis, the 2025 NPC forecast, pre-
7 weather normalization, is within reason, if not
8 conservative.

9 **Q. Why are summer and winter prices particularly critical**
10 **when comparing price changes?**

11 A. Summer and winter peak periods are periods of high
12 customer demand and stressed system conditions and
13 higher power prices in those periods will produce NPC
14 that is substantially higher relative to any decrease in
15 NPC that may result from lowered prices in spring and
16 fall months, which have light load and relatively mild
17 system conditions.


18 **Q. Please provide the actual NPC incurred by the Company**
19 **since the filing of the prior GRC.**

20 A. Table 'NPC Variance' and Figure 'NPC Variance' show both
21 actual and forecast NPC from calendar year ("CY") 2020
22 to CY 2025 where available.

Table NPC Variance⁶

NPC Year	Total Company <u>Actual</u> NPC (\$)	Total Company <u>Forecast</u> NPC (\$)	Rate Mitigation <u>Proposed</u> NPC (\$)
2020	1,511,314,189	1,441,320,020	
2021	1,714,607,879	1,367,917,419	
2022	2,040,318,303	1,369,404,716	
2023	2,555,124,438	2,016,140,036	
2024		2,681,145,109	
2025		2,650,729,651	2,009,323,535
2026			2,650,729,651

Figure NPC Variance⁷



1 As can be seen in Table 'NPC Variance' and Figure
 2 'NPC Variance', not only was there a substantial NPC
 3 under-forecast in the prior GRC which forecasted CY
 4 2021; also, actual NPC from 2020 to 2023 has increased
 5 year over year. Most of this increase is attributable to

⁶ Calendar years 2020, 2022, 2023 and 2024 pull forecasts from the Oregon Transition Adjustment Mechanism.

⁷ *Id.*

1 wholesale electricity (power) and natural gas fuel
2 market prices, weather conditions, fuel supply
3 constraints, retail load increases, and regulatory
4 obligations.

5 Also of note is that calendar years 2020, 2021,
6 2022, and 2023 have seen an increase in abnormal/extreme
7 weather events that have resulted in higher-than-
8 expected load during stressed system conditions, and
9 this trend has set expectations amongst market
10 participants for similar conditions in 2024 and 2025.

11 **Q. Please describe some of the changes in system conditions**
12 **experienced by the Company in 2021, the prior GRC's NPC**
13 **test period.**

14 A. In CY 2021, a few extreme and unforeseen weather events
15 drove increases in actual NPC. For instance, there was
16 a polar vortex engulfing the region in February 2021 and
17 a heat dome event in July 2021. The average purchased
18 power price was \$30.68/MWh higher than the average
19 purchased power price forecasted in the base NPC,
20 contributing to a substantial increase in purchased
21 power expense. Additionally, the Company also faced
22 severe drought conditions that resulted in hydroelectric
23 generation being lower than forecast, resulting in
24 increased purchased power volumes - and associated
25 expense - to provide replacement energy. The Company

1 also faced supply chain issues that were a result of a
2 global supply chain disruption which resulted in
3 construction delays for many of the Company's renewable
4 resources that would have otherwise achieved an earlier
5 commercial online date. These delays resulted in
6 increased purchased power volumes and associated
7 expense.

8 **Q. Please describe some of the changes in system conditions**
9 **experienced by the Company in 2022.**

10 A. In CY 2022, like 2021, unforeseen weather events again
11 drove increases in actual NPC, such as the multiple heat
12 waves in the region during the summer of 2022 and ongoing
13 drought conditions. These drivers increased peak period
14 power prices and reduced hydro generation availability,
15 respectively. Similarly, there was a historic cyclone
16 event in the winter of 2022 that impacted power and
17 natural gas prices. For example, average prices at the
18 Opal natural gas trading hub were 424 percent higher in
19 December 2022 as compared to December 2021 while peak
20 power prices at the Mid-Columbia trading hub were 380
21 percent higher. Lastly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine
22 substantially increased natural gas market prices
23 throughout the year. These events, taken together,
24 contributed to substantial increases in purchased power
25 expense and natural gas fuel expense.

1 **Q. Please describe some of the changes in system conditions**
2 **experienced by the Company in 2023.**

3 A. In CY 2023 coal fuel supply constraints, which began at
4 the end of CY 2022: (1) continued throughout 2023; (2)
5 still impact the Company today; and (3) are anticipated
6 to continue through 2025. On a more comprehensive note,
7 power prices and natural gas prices have risen sharply
8 since the beginning of 2021. Between 2016 and 2020, the
9 average monthly heavy load hour ("HLH") market price at
10 the Mid-Columbia power trading hub ("Mid-C") was
11 \$29.27/MWh and at the Four Corners trading hub ("4C"),
12 \$35.11/MWh. This is compared to the average monthly HLH
13 power prices in 2023 which were \$85.51/MWh and
14 \$81.12/MWh at Mid-C and 4C, respectively. Similarly,
15 between 2016 and 2020, the average monthly gas price at
16 the Opal gas trading hub was \$2.51/MMBtu and at the Sumas
17 gas trading hub, \$3.19/MMBtu. This is compared to the
18 average monthly gas prices in 2023 which were
19 \$4.70/MMBtu and \$4.22/MMBtu at Opal and Sumas,
20 respectively. Reduced coal generation increased
21 purchased power expense and increased natural gas fuel
22 expense due to the need for replacement power.

23 Additionally, the impacts of the Washington Cap and
24 Invest Program increased NPC through increased expenses
25 related to the procurement of greenhouse gas ("GHG")

1 allowances for the out-of-state export of energy from
2 the Chehalis gas plant, physically located in
3 Washington. The associated increase in 2023 NPC was \$42
4 million on a total-Company basis. Of note, the absence
5 of any generation from the Chehalis plant would result
6 in an increase to NPC, relative to the status quo of the
7 Washington Cap and Invest Program, due to replacement
8 energy being sourced from market purchases, which are
9 more expensive than the cost of Chehalis' fuel and GHG
10 allowances combined.


11 **Q. Please generally describe the changes in 2025 NPC**
12 **compared to the 2021 NPC from the 2021 GRC.**

13 A. The NPC forecast from the 2021 GRC used a March 31, 2021
14 vintage OFPC to set the price expectations for a calendar
15 year 2021 NPC forecast. Compared to calendar year 2025
16 price forecasts using a March 29, 2024 vintage OFPC,
17 average power market prices at the Mid-Columbia power
18 trading hub increased by 131 percent and average natural
19 gas fuel market prices at the Sumas gas trading hub
20 increased by 71 percent. The changes are illustrated in
21 Figure 'OFPC' below. As a result of increase in prices
22 and other substantive changes to the 2025 landscape,
23 which I discuss in more detail below, **total-Company NPC**
24 increased by approximately \$15.78/MWh, or 67 percent,

1 from the 2021 GRC forecast of \$23.41/MWh to the current
2 weather normalized GRC forecast of \$39.19/MWh.

3 **On an Idaho-allocated basis,** the Company's weather
4 normalized NPC as modeled for the NPC test period in
5 this case have increased by \$14.80/MWh, or 60 percent,
6 from the 2021 GRC forecast of \$24.54/MWh to the current
7 weather normalized GRC forecast of \$39.34/MWh.

Figure OFPC



8 **Q. What actions have the Company taken to lower NPC?**

9 A. The Company has implemented a number of initiatives to
10 lower NPC. Prime examples of these initiatives are as
11 follows:

12 1. Participation in the Western Energy Imbalance
13 Market ("WEIM"). The Company has been an active
14 participant in the WEIM since its inception in 2014
15 and has realized substantial benefits, helping to

1 drive NPC downwards. From the prior GRC to 2023 the
2 Company realized an annual average of \$147 million
3 in WEIM benefits.⁸

4 2. Participation in the Extended Day-Ahead Market
5 ("EDAM"). The Company announced in 2022 that it
6 will join the California Independent System
7 Operator's EDAM.⁹ Similar to the WEIM, the EDAM will
8 leverage a diverse pool of participating utilities,
9 creating a region-wide day-ahead market, to lower
10 the Company's NPC. Preliminary analysis indicates
11 that the Company may realize savings of up to \$181
12 million per year,¹⁰ which are incremental to (not
13 double counting) the current NPC benefits realized
14 through WEIM participation.

15 3. Resource Expansion - Post 2021 the Company has
16 procured and repowered a number of owned wind
17 facilities (with marginal costs of \$0/MWh) that
18 drive NPC down. Concurrently and synergistically,
19 the Company has increased investment in
20 transmission expansion in order to facilitate the
21 transfer of the aforementioned \$0/MWh energy to the
22 wider system. These new wind and transmission
23 assets have driven NPC down by \$87 million for the
24 NPC test period.

25 **IV. REGIONAL MARKET PRICE INCREASES**

26 **Q. Why have regional power and gas market prices increased**
27 **to such extraordinary highs since the prior GRC?**

28 A. Regional power market prices are driven primarily by
29 regional gas market prices which are in turn primarily
30 driven by natural gas fuel prices. Since March 2021 (the
31 vintage of the OFPC used in the 2021 GRC filing), natural

⁸ <https://www.westerneim.com/Pages/About/QuarterlyBenefits.aspx>.

⁹ <https://www.pacificorp.com/about/newsroom/news-releases/EDAM-innovative-efforts.html>; <https://www.caiso.com/Documents/extended-day-ahead-market-edam-fact-sheet.pdf>.

¹⁰ <https://www.brattle.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Brattle-EDAM-Simulations-PacifiCorp-Results.pdf>.

1 gas prices have seen extraordinary year-over-year
2 increases, as detailed below.

3 **Q. Why have natural gas fuel prices seen extraordinary**
4 **increases since the March 2021 natural gas price**
5 ***forecast?***

6 A. Drivers of natural gas price increases in the 2025
7 forecast relative to the *forecast* created in the first
8 quarter of 2021 are: (1) the conflict in Ukraine which
9 decreased European availability of natural gas,
10 previously sourced from Russian imports. With decreased
11 European supply, the associated European demand turned
12 to U.S. domestic supply to fill the gap and the increased
13 competition over domestic supply drove regional natural
14 gas fuel prices upwards; and (2) expectations of
15 increased natural gas exports to Mexico and an uptick in
16 natural gas consumption in the power sector. The
17 expected increase in gas demand in the power sector can
18 be linked to substantial backlogs of renewable energy
19 projects currently in interconnection queues across the
20 region. Natural gas pipeline exports to Mexico are
21 anticipated to grow in response to increased power
22 demands and expanding liquid natural gas ("LNG") export
23 capacities. This increase in natural gas fuel prices
24 correspondingly increases regional gas market prices and
25 regional power market prices, in that order.

1 **Q. What is the impact of increased natural gas fuel prices**
2 **on 2025 NPC?**

3 A. NPC decreased by \$104 million when the current 2025
4 forecast gas prices were replaced with the 2021 forecast
5 gas prices used in the prior GRC, under the weather
6 normalized modeling scenario.

7 **Q. Why has renewable resource integration experienced**
8 **delays relative to prior expectations?**

9 A. Global supply chain constraints delayed production and
10 transportation of key components and equipment necessary
11 for renewable resource construction across the nation.
12 Furthermore, increases in the prices of key renewable
13 resource construction commodities such as lithium,
14 nickel, and copper, as well as increases in labor costs
15 and interest rates, exacerbated the issue. Lastly,
16 substantial backlogs of renewable energy projects
17 currently in interconnection queues across the region
18 delay the integration of renewable resources into the
19 western interconnection.

20 **Q. How have renewable resource integration delays impacted**
21 **regional power market prices?**

22 A. In resource planning at the regional level, renewable
23 resource integration is expected to partially offset the
24 impact of thermal plant retirements on an energy basis.
25 In the short term, as the integration of these renewable

1 resources are delayed, thermal plant retirements
2 continue on schedule. The resulting energy shortfall
3 decreases supply without any associated decrease in
4 demand (load). Consequently, this triggers an
5 incremental energy price rise across the competitive
6 regional power markets which is additive to the
7 exacerbation caused by natural gas fuel price increases.

8 **Q. What is the impact of increased power prices on 2025**
9 **NPC?**

10 A. NPC decreased by \$304 million when the 2025 forecast
11 power prices were replaced with 2021 forecast power
12 prices from the March 2021 OFPC used in the prior GRC,
13 under the weather normalized modeling scenario.

14 **Q. Have these global events impacted coal supply and**
15 **associated coal fuel prices?**

16 A. Yes. Because of higher regional natural gas market
17 prices and delays in renewable resource constructions,
18 coal generation would be expected to increase, all other
19 things equal. This increase in the demand for coal
20 pressures domestic coal supply in the short term,
21 resulting in higher coal fuel prices, which in turn drive
22 regional power market prices higher. This situation is
23 further exacerbated by coal supply challenges, discussed
24 in more detail below. This increase in regional power
25 market prices is additive to the increase caused by

1 natural gas fuel price increases and additive to the
2 increase caused by delays in renewable resource
3 integration.

4 **Q. What is the impact of increased coal fuel prices and new**
5 **coal supply agreements on 2025 NPC?**

6 A. The NPC impact is a \$280 million increase, under the
7 weather normalized modeling scenario, calculated by
8 replacing current coal assumptions with coal volumes and
9 prices prior to the increased fuel prices and new supply
10 agreements. These changes to coal supplies are discussed
11 in more detail below.

12 **Q. Please elaborate on further drivers of regional power**
13 **market price increases.**

14 A. A long-term drought, dating back to the 2019-2020
15 winter, continues across parts of the Pacific Northwest
16 and the consequent decrease in expected hydroelectric
17 generation (currently 25 percent lower than the 10-year
18 average at the regional level) diminishes the expected
19 regional energy supply.

20 Furthermore, calendar years 2020, 2021, 2022 and
21 2023 have seen an increase in abnormal/extreme weather
22 events that have resulted in higher-than-expected load
23 during stressed system conditions, and this trend has
24 set expectations amongst market participants for similar
25 conditions in 2024 and 2025. Therefore, many utilities

1 across the region have revised their expectations of
2 load profiles upwards and this limits excess supply
3 offered into the regional power markets.

4 These two weather-based drivers increase regional
5 power market prices and both are additive to the increase
6 caused by natural gas fuel price increases, additive to
7 the increase caused by delays in renewable resource
8 construction and additive to the increase caused by
9 increased competition for coal supply.

10 **V. POLICY AND OPERATIONS IMPACT TO NPC**

11 **Q. What policy or operations changes are forecast to have**
12 **a substantial impact on 2025 NPC as compared to the prior**
13 **GRC?**

14 A. There are three, which are: 1) the introduction of a
15 dispatch adder impacting generation at Chehalis; 2)
16 decreased hydroelectric generation resulting from the
17 deconstruction of hydroelectric facilities along the
18 Klamath river; and (3) coal supply challenges.

19 **A. The Washington Cap and Invest Program**

20 **Q. How does the WA-GHG Program impact the Company's load**
21 **service in Idaho?**

22 A. The WA-GHG program requires that the Company purchase
23 GHG allowances for any GHG emissions output within the
24 state of Washington associated with energy exported
25 outside the state of Washington. The only source of GHG

1 emitting energy owned by the Company in the state of
2 Washington is the Chehalis gas-fired plant. For all
3 energy exported out of Washington from the Chehalis
4 plant, there is an associated GHG cost proportionate to
5 the energy exported. Therefore, for all energy allocated
6 to Idaho from the Chehalis plant, there is an incremental
7 \$/MWh cost based on the GHG allowance price for the NPC
8 test period.

9 **Q. What is the GHG allowance price applied to the Chehalis**
10 **plant for this NPC test period?**

11 A. The GHG allowance price is currently estimated at
12 \$11.14/MWh for calendar year 2025 based on auction
13 results from March 6, 2024.

14 **Q. How is the WA-GHG program similar to other Commission**
15 **approved programs?**

16 A. The WA-GHG program is a program that assesses a charge
17 per MWh of energy produced from certain types of
18 resources located in Washington state. From a cost
19 perspective, the impact of this program on the Company's
20 service territory is identical to the impact of costs
21 associated with initiatives like wind taxes and coal
22 fuel taxes that increase Company NPC.

23 **Q. What is the impact to NPC from this program?**

24 A. The impact of this program is an increase of \$29 million.
25 This increase is driven by the cost of GHG allowances

1 and increased market purchases to cover generation
2 reduction at the Chehalis plant.

3 **B. Hydroelectric Generation Reduction**

4 **Q. How much has hydroelectric generation decreased between**
5 **the 2021 GRC and this current filing?**

6 A. The forecast for calendar year 2025 hydroelectric
7 generation has decreased by approximately 663,120 MWh
8 (19 percent) as compared to the calendar year 2021
9 forecast from the 2021 GRC.

10 **Q. Why has hydroelectric generation decreased by 19**
11 **percent?**

12 A. A long-term drought, dating back to the 2019-2020
13 winter, continues across parts of the Pacific Northwest
14 (current hydroelectric generation is 25 percent lower
15 than the 10-year average at the regional level) and is
16 picked up in the normalized hydroelectric generation
17 forecast. Furthermore, the removal of four Company-
18 operated hydroelectric projects¹¹ along the Klamath river
19 contribute to this decrease. These projects totaled
20 approximately 180 MW of capacity and have ceased
21 generation.

22 **Q. What is the impact to NPC of the long-term drought as**
23 **well as the hydroelectric projects' removal?**

24 A. The impact is an increase of \$29 million. This increase

¹¹ J.C. Boyle, Copco 1, Copco 2, and Iron Gate hydroelectric projects.

1 is driven by increased market purchases to cover the
2 generation reduction.

3 **C. Coal Supply Challenges**

4 **Q. What changes are there to projected coal supply in this**
5 **GRC?**

6 A. In 2022 through 2024, the coal market experienced
7 strained conditions. The unprecedented increase in coal
8 prices, instability in coal supply and overall market
9 fluctuations have caused adverse impacts to the Company
10 and other large consumers. This negative impact is due
11 to multiple factors, including but not limited to: (1)
12 increased coal demand due to high domestic natural gas
13 prices; (2) low inventories at coal-fired power plants;
14 (3) increased demand abroad for coal exports; (4)
15 international and domestic supply chain constraints; (5)
16 labor and material shortages; and (6) weather events and
17 general market inflation.¹²

18 Moreover, the Lila Canyon mine fire removed
19 approximately 25 percent of Utah coal production and
20 disrupted the same portion of the Company's coal supply
21 needs in Utah.¹³ On November 18, 2023, the Company was
22 informed that the Lila Canyon mine will not reopen and

¹² *In the Matter of PacifiCorp d/b/a Pacific Power, 2024 Transition Adjustment Mechanism, Exhibit PAC/200, Owen/3-7 (April 3, 2023).*

¹³ *In the Matter of PacifiCorp d/b/a Pacific Power, 2024 Transition Adjustment Mechanism, Exhibit PAC/200, Owen/4 (April 3, 2023).*

1 will be permanently closed. The closure of Lila Canyon
2 created a significant coal production shortfall in Utah,
3 beginning in 2022, and will continue to have negative
4 impacts to all large consumers, including the Company.

5 In addition to the Lila Canyon mine issues in Utah,
6 coal suppliers continue to experience issues relating to
7 unfavorable geologic and mining conditions, delays and
8 pressure relating to securing federal mining leases,
9 limited availability of trucking and railway
10 transportation for coal, long lead-times for procurement
11 of necessary mining equipment, and limitations in
12 availability of financing, which has put them at an
13 increased risk of becoming insolvent.

14 **Q. What is the impact to NPC from these coal supply**
15 **challenges?**

16 A. As mentioned above, the impact of these coal supply
17 challenges is an increase of \$265 million on a total-
18 Company basis. This increase is driven by increased
19 natural gas generation and increased market purchases to
20 cover the coal generation reduction.

21 **Q. What steps has the Company taken to alleviate these coal**
22 **supply challenges?**

23 A. The Company focuses on achieving its target coal supply
24 at a reasonable price, along with contract terms that
25 provide flexibility. However, because the Utah coal

1 market has been supply constrained since 2022, the
2 Company has had limited leverage to accomplish these
3 goals. [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]

20 **Q. How has the Company ensured a dependable and secure**
21 **future coal supply for the Hunter and Huntington plants?**

22 **A.** In February 2024, the Company amended the Hunter and
23 Huntington coal supply agreements with Wolverine. The
24 amended Hunter/Wolverine CSA [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED] for the Hunter plant.
2 Beginning in [REDACTED], the Hunter/Wolverine CSA amendment
3 facilitates additional coal production through renewed
4 operations at the Fossil Rock mine in Emery County, Utah.
5 Deliveries from the Fossil Rock mine will begin in [REDACTED].
6 When fully operational, the Fossil Rock mine will
7 provide [REDACTED] tons per year to the Hunter plant,
8 [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED]. The contract amendment also allows the Company
10 to direct this coal to the Huntington plant as needed.
11 The amended Huntington/Wolverine CSA now also allows the
12 Company the flexibility to direct coal to the Hunter
13 plant as needed. The Huntington/Wolverine CSA [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED].

16 **Q. How does the Company plan to meet fuel supplies for its**
17 **coal-fired plants in 2025?**

18 A. The Company employs a diversified coal supply strategy,
19 with 84 percent of its 2025 coal requirements supplied
20 by third-party coal supplies and 16 percent with coal
21 from its captive affiliate mines. The third-party
22 contracts consist of fixed-price and variable-priced
23 contracts. Coal amounts in my testimony are shown on a
24 total-Company basis.

1 Q. Please generally describe the coal supply arrangements
 2 across the Company's coal-fired plants for 2025.

3 A. The following Confidential Table 'Coal Contracts'
 4 summarizes the coal supply arrangements and costs for
 5 2025 in comparison to the 2021 GRC:

Confidential Table Coal Contracts

Plant	Vendor	2025 Delivered Tons (millions)	2025 \$/Ton	2021 \$/Ton	\$/Ton Change	Comments
Jim Bridger	Black Butte Coal Company					
Jim Bridger	Bridger Coal Company					
Colstrip	Westmoreland Rosebud Mining					
Craig	Trapper Mine					
Hayden	Peabody Coal Sales					
Hunter	Bronco Utah Operations					
Hunter	Wolverine Fuel Sales					

Plant	Vendor	2025 Delivered Tons (millions)	2025 \$/Ton	2021 \$/Ton	\$/Ton Change	Comments
Hunter	Gentry Mountain					
Huntington	Wolverine Fuel Sales					
Dave Johnston	Peabody Coal Sales (Caballo 8500)					
Dave Johnston	Peabody Coal Sales (Caballo 8400)					
Dave Johnston	Arch Coal Sales					
Dave Johnston	Open positions					
Naughton	Kemmerer Operations					
Wyodak	Black Hills -Wyodak Resources					

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D. Cumulative Impact

Q. What is the combined impact of the various changes on NPC?

A. Total-company 2025 weather normalized NPC decrease by a total of \$508 million when 2025 assumptions were replaced with the prior GRC's 2021 forecast assumptions,

1 for power prices, fuel prices, and policy and operations
2 assumptions.

3 Put another way, 2025 weather normalized NPC as
4 modeled in Aurora is \$1.766 billion when assuming
5 commodity prices, fuel supply, and policies and
6 operations that were expected for 2021 in the prior GRC.
7 This accounts for a majority of the increase between the
8 2021 NPC actuals (which the prior GRC attempted to
9 forecast) and the current 2025 weather normalized NPC
10 forecast.

11 **VI. NPC AND TRANSITION BETWEEN MODELS**

12 **Q. Did the Company transition to Aurora to calculate NPC?**

13 A. Yes. The Company has used GRID since it was deployed in
14 2008 but discontinued its use for NPC filings in 2021
15 and transitioned to Aurora, produced by Energy Exemplar.
16 Aurora provides additional functionality, increases
17 usability, as well as increases compatibility with the
18 Company's information technology.

19 To date, the Company has filed NPC forecasts using
20 Aurora in California, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming.
21 Additionally, Aurora includes certain functionality
22 necessary to perform the allocation of state-specific
23 NPC for ratemaking purposes in the post-interim period

1 as contemplated in the 2020 PacifiCorp Inter-
2 Jurisdictional Allocation Protocol ("2020 Protocol").¹⁴

3 **Q. Is the Company's general approach to the calculation of**
4 **NPC using GRID the same in this case as in previous**
5 **cases?**

6 A. Yes. The general approach to the calculation of NPC is
7 the same, but the model has changed from GRID to Aurora.

8 **A. An Overview of Aurora**

9 **Q. How does Aurora work?**

10 A. Similar to GRID and other production cost models, the
11 objective of Aurora is to meet the projected load at the
12 lowest possible cost. This is accomplished by simulating
13 the dispatch of available resources, both supply-side
14 and demand-side, within their physical constraints,
15 economic constraints, transmission constraints and
16 emissions constraints, as well as adhering to the
17 profiles of the load requirements to produce a cost
18 minimizing simulation where demand and supply are
19 balanced.

20 Like GRID, Aurora's simulations take as input
21 information such as system load, reserves, wholesale
22 sales and purchase contracts for electricity, natural

¹⁴ *In the Matter of Rocky Mountain Power's Application for Approval of the 2020 PacifiCorp Inter-Jurisdictional Allocation Protocol*. Case No. PAC-E-19-20. Order No. 34640 (April 22, 2020); *In the Matter of Rocky Mountain Power's Petition for Approval of an Extension of the 2020 Inter-Jurisdictional Allocation Protocol*. Case No. PAC-E-23-13 Order No. 35984 (Nov. 2, 2023).

1 gas and wheeling, market prices for electricity and
2 natural gas, fuel expenses, transmission topology, and
3 the characteristics and availability of the Company's
4 supply-side and demand-side facilities.

5 **Q. How does Aurora compare to GRID?**

6 A. The model logic is conceptually the same between Aurora
7 and GRID; both models aim to minimize costs to serve
8 obligations, under various constraints. While the
9 categories of inputs are mostly the same between the two
10 models, Aurora has more parameters to model resources
11 and offers more flexibility to model more types of
12 resources.

13 **Q. What are some of the modeling improvements gained by
14 moving to Aurora?**

15 A. Aurora co-optimizes (as opposed to sequentially
16 optimizing) energy and ancillary service requirements,
17 allowing the model to create precise NPC forecasts that
18 simultaneously satisfy all load and reserve obligations
19 while appropriately reflecting the forecasted NPC. In
20 addition, Aurora can receive more than one incremental
21 price for the purpose of forecasting dispatch of coal-
22 fired resources and can recognize and optimize around
23 volumetric constraints in each price tier (minimum take
24 volumes, volume limits, etc.). Furthermore, Aurora
25 allows for the modeling of emissions constraints and

1 associated emissions rates and emissions prices,
2 allowing the Company to integrate compliance with
3 various emissions constraints within the model.

4 **Q. What is the process by which the Company validated the**
5 **use of Aurora as compared to GRID?**

6 A. Both GRID and Aurora are production cost optimization
7 models that use mathematical optimization techniques
8 with similar inputs that attempt to satisfy the
9 Company's load and reserve obligations at minimum cost.
10 Aurora has more features and flexibility, but both
11 models are based on the same underlying economic
12 principles. The validation process started with the
13 understanding that the results from the two models will
14 be different. Based on that understanding, the process
15 included steps such as: 1) verify if the outputs of non-
16 dispatchable resources match the inputs, and the outputs
17 match between Aurora and GRID; 2) refine input
18 parameters in Aurora that are either not available in
19 GRID or have a different impact on optimization; and 3)
20 research the reasons why the same dispatchable resources
21 with generally the same inputs produce different results
22 between Aurora and GRID. And, finally, the total NPC
23 from the two models are compared and reviewed for
24 reasonableness which includes ensuring that the
25 deviation in the total NPC is within a reasonable range.

1 **Q. Why would the same resources produce different results**
2 **from Aurora and GRID when they have the same inputs?**

3 A. The inputs in the two models are not the same because
4 Aurora allows for more modeling parameters and more
5 levels of granularity. Additionally, Aurora co-optimizes
6 energy and ancillary service requirements by using an
7 advanced mixed integer program, whereas GRID
8 sequentially optimizes one requirement then the other.
9 Furthermore, Aurora uses its mixed integer program for
10 commitment (startup/shutdown) decisions whereas GRID
11 applies relatively basic static optimization techniques.
12 Differences in the optimization techniques lead to
13 different unit commitments and different unit dispatches
14 based on the prevailing economics.

15 **Q. Can you provide the results of the Company's validation**
16 **process?**

17 A. Yes. Please refer to Exhibit No. 24 and Exhibit No. 25,
18 which contain the Aurora and GRID NPC test reports that
19 the Company used to validate Aurora. The test reports
20 show that there was less than 0.8 percent variation
21 between the NPC calculated with GRID as compared to
22 Aurora.

1 **Q. While the overall variation was low, there may have been**
2 **greater variation in individual resources when comparing**
3 **the two test reports. Can you comment?**

4 A. Yes. As I discussed above, there are differences between
5 Aurora and GRID with regards to optimization techniques.
6 In addition, each model contemplates different levels of
7 granularity of inputs. Those two in combination will
8 result in different dispatch of resources, and different
9 balancing transactions. Therefore, the validation
10 process compared the overall outcome of the NPC test
11 report.

12 **Q. Would running GRID with the inputs used for this rate**
13 **case provide additional useful information regarding the**
14 **validation of the Aurora model?**

15 A. No. As described above, the ability of each model to
16 accept different inputs and the internal optimization
17 techniques differ between the models even though the
18 underlying principles are similar. Furthermore, there
19 are inputs in Aurora that are not capable of being
20 accepted by GRID (example, emissions constraints and
21 tiered price/volume coal contracts). There is no
22 reasonable expectation that the model results would be
23 the same or would provide additional insight, making the
24 proposed comparison a futile exercise. Additionally, the
25 Company has already benchmarked Aurora against GRID and

1 found that the overall NPC results exhibited a tolerable
2 variance between the two models when limiting the inputs
3 to those capable of being simultaneously accepted by
4 both models.

5 **Q. Has the Company performed any other benchmark of Aurora?**

6 A. Yes. The Company performed a backcast of calendar year
7 2020, wherein 2020 historical inputs were fed into
8 Aurora, and then the 2020 calendar year was "forecast"
9 ("backcast") to assess whether the resulting NPC would
10 align with the actual NPC observed in 2020. The 2020
11 backcast, as well as a write up analyzing its results,
12 are provided in Confidential Exhibit No. 26.

13 **Q. What do the results of this backcast show?**

14 A. The backcast demonstrates that Aurora produces accurate
15 results. 2020 actual NPC was \$1.511 billion and Aurora's
16 backcast of 2020 produced NPC of \$1.453 billion, an
17 under-forecast of 3.9% and a demonstration of the
18 model's reasonableness.

19 **B. Inputs and Adjustments in Aurora**

20 **Q. How are inputs treated differently between the two**
21 **models?**

22 A. Aurora incorporates many of the same inputs that GRID
23 formerly considered in its optimization. Consequently,
24 many of the same workpapers are still in use, but those
25 inputs flow through Aurora input workbooks to be

1 formatted for acceptance by the newer model. For inputs
2 that are distinct from their GRID equivalents (coal
3 prices, for example), entirely new modeling approaches
4 were employed to take advantage of the additional
5 flexibility offered by Aurora. There are also inputs
6 that are the same but require slightly modified
7 calculations to account for the treatment given to those
8 inputs in Aurora (unit minimum operating levels and
9 thermal outage rates, for example).

10 **Q. How is the output from Aurora incorporated into Idaho-**
11 **allocated NPC?**

12 A. The Aurora model results are used to create a total-
13 Company NPC forecast and the total-Company NPC report is
14 similar to the report that has been used in the past.
15 Those results are then allocated by Company witness
16 Shelley E. McCoy according to the 2020 Protocol to arrive
17 at an Idaho-allocated NPC forecast.

18 **Q. Please describe any other significant modeling**
19 **differences between GRID and Aurora.**

20 A. As mentioned above, Aurora accounts for unit minimum
21 operating levels ("unit minimums") and equivalent outage
22 rates ("EOR") differently, and both required formulaic
23 updates because of differences in the modeling of unit
24 availabilities. Aurora scales both the unit maximum
25 capacity and the unit minimum in response to a derate

1 because Aurora requires unit minimums to be expressed as
2 a percentage of unit maximum capacity. In GRID, unit
3 minimums were required to be expressed in absolute
4 megawatt ("MW") amounts. Prior to settling upon a
5 revised approach to the calculation of these inputs, the
6 Company observed many hours where the generation
7 forecast showed output below a unit's minimum. A
8 relatively straightforward solution was adopted by the
9 Company that only required the calculation and input of
10 an hourly unit minimum percentage (percentage of unit
11 capacity) timeseries to account for derates. To avoid
12 the possibility of infeasible operations, another
13 modification was made to the EOR to remove units from
14 service (that is, the EOR was set to 100 percent)
15 whenever the available capacity slipped below the unit
16 minimum. In addition, Aurora can receive more than one
17 incremental price for the purpose of forecasting
18 dispatch of coal fired resources and can recognize and
19 optimize around volumetric constraints in each price
20 tier (minimum take volumes, volume limits, etc.). That
21 modeling improvement allows the Company to more easily
22 arrive at a forecast of coal unit dispatch that is
23 subject to volumetric constraints and tiered pricing
24 across a range of consumption levels.

1 **Q. Is the Day-Ahead/Real-Time ("DA/RT") Adjustment needed**
2 **in Aurora?**

3 A. Yes. The DA/RT adjustment is used to better reflect
4 system balancing costs that are not fully captured in
5 the Aurora model. This adjustment indicates a deviation
6 of actual market prices available to the Company in real
7 operations from the historical monthly trading-hub-
8 indexed market prices. The DA/RT adjustment is the
9 result of multiple variables within a dynamic system in
10 which the Company has historically bought more during
11 higher-than-average price periods and sold more during
12 lower-than-average price periods.

13 To better reflect the market prices available to
14 the Company when it transacts in the real-time market,
15 the Company includes separate prices for forecast system
16 balancing sales and purchases in Aurora. These prices
17 account for the historical price differences between the
18 Company's purchases and sales compared to the monthly
19 average market-indexed prices.

20 Additionally, like GRID, the volume of system
21 balancing transactions generated by Aurora do not
22 reflect the volumetric inefficiencies and associated
23 costs of the operational practice of transacting on a
24 quarterly, monthly, daily and real-time basis. Because
25 Aurora balances the Company's load and resources to

1 fractions of a megawatt for each hour in a single step,
2 it avoids the additional purchase and sale transactions
3 that occur in actual operations as the Company
4 progresses through balancing its system on a quarterly,
5 monthly, daily, and real time horizon basis.

6 For instance, if the Company buys a monthly product
7 that aligns with the Company's average open position for
8 the month, one can expect that approximately half of the
9 days will still have a remaining position to be covered
10 by additional daily purchases. On the other days, the
11 Company will have to make daily sales to unwind the
12 excess volume. The same is true for daily transactions—
13 in some hours the volume acquired will be too low, while
14 in others it will be too high, and additional purchases
15 and sales will be required to cover the Company's actual
16 position in real-time.

17 Finally, buying or selling standard block products
18 will not result in a perfect balance of load and
19 resources. This difference then must be closed out in
20 the real-time market where the Company is a price-taker.

21 **VII. MODELING IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NPC FORECAST**

22 **Q. Why are modeling improvements necessary?**

23 A. Modeling improvements align the NPC forecast with
24 operational realities in order to produce an accurate
25 forecast.

1 Q. What modeling improvements have been implemented since
2 the 2021 GRC?

3 A. The Company has incorporated the following improvements
4 since the last rate case:

5 • The DA/RT market price adder will be changed from a
6 flat value to a percentage.

7 • Trapped energy will be appropriately substituted for
8 curtailment of generation to reflect actual
9 operations.

10 • The maximum capacity of certain thermal generation
11 units will be updated to reflect ambient temperature
12 derates to unit capacity during the summer months.

13 • The NPC forecast will simulate power hedging
14 transactions in order to maintain compliance with the
15 Company's current Energy Risk Management Policy.

16 • The calculation of capacity limits on modeled market
17 sales have been updated, and no longer include power
18 hedging transactions.

19 A. DA/RT Adjustment - Price Component

20 Q. Please explain how the price component of the DA/RT
21 adjustment operates.

22 A. The price component of the DA/RT adjustment addresses
23 the costs incurred by the Company as a result of multiple
24 variables within a dynamic system in which the Company
25 has historically bought more during higher-than-average
26 price periods and sold more during lower-than-average
27 price periods.

28 To better reflect the market prices available to
29 the Company when it transacts in the real-time market,

1 the Company includes separate prices for forecast system
2 balancing sales and purchases in Aurora. These prices
3 account for the historical price differences between the
4 Company's purchases and sales compared to the trading-
5 hub-indexed market prices. Previously these prices were
6 calculated by adding or subtracting a flat dollar amount
7 to the hourly scaled prices from the OFPC.

8 **Q. Has the Company proposed a refinement to the price
9 component of the DA/RT in this case?**

10 A. Yes. The Company proposes to change the DA/RT
11 adjustment's price component from a flat dollar adder to
12 a percentage-of-market-price adder.

13 **Q. Please explain how changing the DA/RT adjustment's price
14 component from a flat value to a percentage of market
15 price results in a DA/RT adjustment that is more
16 reflective of actual operations.**

17 A. Changing the price calculation to a percentage of the
18 market prices aids in accounting for the volatility
19 caused by prices and system conditions not captured in
20 day-ahead transactions. Take, for example, a \$5 price
21 adder in an hour when the market price is \$25. This
22 resolves to a 20 percent price adder. But using the \$5
23 price adder when market prices are \$75 would fail to
24 account for the system and market conditions during that
25 hour. Using a 20 percent price adder during hours when

1 market price is \$75 would yield in a \$15 price adder,
2 which is more reflective of the system conditions. A key
3 benefit of using a percentage adder is that it allows
4 the modeling to capture intra-monthly variability.
5 Subsequently, this is a significantly more accurate
6 representation of real operating conditions experienced
7 by the Company.

8 **Q. Why has the transition to Aurora not resolved the need**
9 **for a DA/RT price component?**

10 A. As noted above, the basis of the DA/RT price component
11 is founded in the historical price differences between
12 the Company's purchases and sales as compared to the
13 monthly average market prices. The fact that there are
14 historical price differences between the Company's
15 purchases and sales as compared to the monthly average
16 market prices is agnostic to the model used to forecast
17 Company purchases and sales. Therefore, the transition
18 to Aurora has not resolved the basis for the DA/RT price
19 component.

20 **Q. How does a percentage adjustment better capture intra-**
21 **month price variability as compared to a flat dollar**
22 **adjustment?**


23 A. Below, I provide analysis on the drivers of the DA/RT
24 price component, including a discussion of historical
25 hourly scaled monthly average market prices as compared

1 to historical hourly scaled Company purchases and
2 associated purchase prices across four years of
3 historical data from 2020 to 2023. This analysis shows
4 that the refinement proposed by the Company more
5 accurately accounts for intra-month price variability in
6 the context of the historical data.

7 **Q. Why is it important to focus on Company purchases instead**
8 **of Company sales?**

9 A. Across the historical period, the total net peak expense
10 incurred from Company purchases is approximately [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED] greater than the total net peak revenues gained
12 from Company sales. Confidential Figure 'DART Net'
13 provides an illustration of this along with the average
14 four-year historical hourly shape of purchase volumes,
15 sales volumes, purchase expenses and sales revenues.
16 This data, along with the observation that throughout
17 the historical period the Company is a net purchaser
18 (importer) on a dollar and volume basis and that Aurora
19 has no market caps on purchases highlights the outsized
20 importance of purchased power and its attendant costs.


Confidential Figure DART Net



- 1 **Q. What does the historical data show when comparing market**
2 **prices to the Company's purchases?**
- 3 A. Confidential Figure 'DART Adder' uses data from 2020 to
4 2023 to create two curves—one illustrating hourly scaled
5 average market-indexed prices and one illustrating
6 hourly scaled average Company purchase prices. The
7 difference between the curves is an illustration of the
8 DA/RT price component. The concept of intra-month price
9 variability is exhibited by the change in price levels
10 across the day for the hourly scaled average market-

1 indexed prices as compared to the hourly scaled average
2 Company purchase prices. This price variability is set
3 forth numerically in Confidential Table 'DART Adder',
4 which shows the numeric difference between the two
5 curves.

Confidential Figure DART Adder



Confidential Table DART Adder

Hour Ending	Average Historical DA/RT Price Component's Adder
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1 **Q. Why do you refer to the variability as "intra-month"**
2 **when the data appears to focus on variability within a**
3 **day?**

4 A. It is important to recall that the OFPC uses monthly
5 prices, which are then scaled down to hourly prices. So
6 intra-month price variability is exhibited as hourly
7 price variability within each day of the month. In my
8 testimony above and as illustrated in Confidential
9 Figure 'DART Adder', this intra-month price variability


1 is presented as average hourly price variability across
2 the four-year historical period for the average day.

3 **Q. The DA/RT price component has historically been a flat**
4 **dollar amount applied to the purchase and sales price.**
5 **Does the historical data support this approach?**

6 A. No. The historical data in Confidential Figure 'DART
7 Adder' and Confidential Table 'DART Adder' shows intra-
8 month variability in the DA/RT price component (i.e.,
9 the variability between the hourly scaled average
10 market-indexed prices and the hourly scaled average
11 Company purchase prices) is not constant across the day;
12 the difference is generally greater as the price
13 increases. If historical market prices supported the
14 DA/RT price component as a flat dollar amount, then the
15 historical values in Confidential Table 'DART Adder'
16 would not exhibit change across the day but rather show
17 consistency.

18 Confidential Figure 'DART Percentile' illustrates
19 this variability in the actual historical DA/RT price
20 component as compared to an illustration of a flat adder.

Confidential Figure DART Percentile



- 1 Q. Is Confidential Figure 'DART Percentile' a visual of
2 historical market price curves in comparison to a flat
3 DA/RT price component?
- 4 A. No. Confidential Figure 'DART Percentile' is a visual of
5 what the historical DA/RT price component is, based
6 solely on the historical relationship between actual
7 market prices and actual Company purchases along with a
8 comparison to a hypothetical flat adder that is
9 separated into heavy load hour ("HLH") and light load
10 hour ("LLH") components. Confidential Figure 'DART
11 Percentile' is a visual of Confidential 'DART Adder'
12 along with a comparison to a hypothetical flat adder

1 that is separated into HLH and LLH components.
2 Confidential Figure 'DART Percentile' is not a visual of
3 a market price curve, even though it looks similar.

4 **Q. Does the historical data support the usage of a**
5 **percentage adder to more accurately account for intra-**
6 **month price variability?**

7 A. Yes. As illustrated in Confidential Figure 'DART Adder'
8 and in Confidential Table 'DART Adder', as the
9 historical average market-indexed price increases, the
10 spread between the historical average market-indexed
11 price and the historical average buy price increases as
12 well. This suggests that a percentage adder is more
13 suitable for capturing the historical interplay between
14 monthly average market prices and Company purchase
15 prices. As illustrated in Confidential Figure 'DART
16 Percentile', the historical data definitively does not
17 suggest that a flat adder is appropriate for capturing
18 this intra-month dynamic. This means that the Company's
19 refinement to the DA/RT price component is a more
20 accurate representation of the difference between
21 average market prices and the Company's transaction
22 prices. Because the purpose of the DA/RT price component
23 is to reflect this difference, the Company's refinement
24 is appropriate and more accurate.

1 **Q. Please quantify the NPC impact of this adjustment.**

2 A. The NPC impact of this adjustment is an increase of \$12
3 million.

4 **B. Trapped Energy**

5 **Q. Please explain the Company's trapped energy concept.**

6 A. Primarily, trapped energy is a modeling concept only and
7 does not exist in actual operations. It represents any
8 excess generation that cannot be used to serve load due
9 to transmission constraints or system-level oversupply.
10 Because of limited transmission and the need for supply
11 and demand to always be balanced, the trapped energy is
12 captured within a modeled trapped energy zone and serves
13 "pseudo load" that is regulated by a "pseudo generator"
14 with an infinite ramp rate ("pseudo" - i.e., the load
15 and generation in the trapped energy zone are also
16 modeling constructs that do not exist in actual
17 operations).

18 **Q. Why was the trapped energy modeling concept necessary in
19 GRID?**

20 A. Conceptually, the trapped energy zones allow for a
21 feasible model solution in the event of an inability to
22 maintain the supply/demand balance when there is excess
23 supply. However, the primary function of trapped energy
24 zones in prior GRID NPC simulations was to allow for
25 company owned production tax credit ("PTC") eligible

1 wind to be modeled with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
2 Due to an inability in GRID to model resources with a
3 negative dispatch price (representative of PTCs, in the
4 case of wind), these wind resources could not provide
5 the proper price signal to the model and therefore could
6 not be accurately represented within GRID's resource
7 stack. As a work-around, the wind resources were
8 simulated as must run resources and all excess wind
9 generation within a transmission constrained area was
10 funneled into a trapped energy zone.

11 **Q. How was energy in the trapped energy zone valued?**

12 A. In the past, the Company valued trapped energy at 75
13 percent of market prices, which led to overstated sales
14 revenue. Since this trapped energy concept does not
15 exist in actual operations, the value of trapped energy
16 should be zero.

17 **Q. How does Aurora eliminate the need for trapped energy**
18 **zones?**

19 A. Aurora allows for wind curtailment while recognizing the
20 PTC benefits that produce an implied negative dispatch
21 cost. By placing the wind resources at the bottom of the
22 resource stack and allowing the model to dispatch the
23 wind resources downwards when there is more energy from
24 the wind resources than there is transmission to move
25 the energy to load, or when the ramp capability of

1 dispatchable resources are unable to follow the hour-
2 to-hour ramps in wind generation, the NPC simulation
3 dispatches (curtails) the wind downwards and
4 appropriately reflects how wind resources are actually
5 operated and actually dispatched downwards in actual
6 operations.

7 **Q. Please quantify the NPC impact of allowing wind to be**
8 **curtailed in similar fashion as actual operations.**

9 A. The NPC impact of allowing for realistic wind
10 curtailment is an increase of \$34 million driven by: 1)
11 a reduction in pseudo-wholesale sales revenue earned
12 from the sales of energy derived from a modeling
13 construct that does not exist in actual operations; and
14 2) incremental wind curtailments to maintain the
15 supply/demand balance within a transmission congested
16 region when considering that any sharp hour-to-hour
17 ramps in wind generation are unable to be completely
18 balanced by relatively slow ramping coal units present
19 in the region.

20 **Q. Please quantify the impact of valuing the trapped energy**
21 **zone at zero percent of market prices after allowing for**
22 **wind curtailments.**

23 A. The impact to NPC is \$0 since after allowing for
24 appropriate wind curtailment the trapped energy modeling
25 construct has been removed. That is to say, there are no

1 more trapped energy zones modeled in this filing.

2 **C. Thermal Attributes**

3 **Q. What updates did the Company make to the characteristics**
4 **of some of its thermal resources?**

5 A. Thermal plant capacities have been previously calculated
6 as the average of historical capacity over general
7 summer and winter periods. For some thermal plants,
8 performance decreases as the ambient temperature
9 increases. As temperatures are historically hotter
10 during the summer months of June through September, the
11 generation output from these thermal plants decreases
12 during those months. To account for this operational
13 constraint, the Company updated the maximum capacities
14 at certain plants during each summer month from June
15 through September. Exhibit No. 27 and Exhibit No. 28
16 demonstrate the degradation in generation capacity that
17 results from increased temperatures. The exhibit graphs
18 were provided to the Company by the General Electric
19 Company and by Siemens Energy AG.

20 **Q. Please explain how this adjustment results in more**
21 **accurate forecast NPC.**

22 A. Because maximum capacities of some thermal plants are
23 reduced as a result of increased temperatures in the
24 summer, not adjusting the capacity during the summer
25 months based on these conditions would result in Aurora

1 overstating plant capacity and generation output, which
2 would consequently understate the need to dispatch
3 higher cost units or increase purchases to serve load
4 during the summer months. Reducing generation capacity
5 during summer based on average summer temperatures is
6 reflective of actual ambient-temperature constraints.

7 **Q. Please quantify the NPC impact of this adjustment.**

8 A. The NPC impact of this adjustment is an increase of \$16.9
9 million. This increase is driven by increased market
10 purchases.

11 **D. Hedging Requirements**

12 **Q. Please briefly provide an overview of the Company's**
13 **power hedging requirements.**

14 A. The Company revised its Risk Management Policy in 2021
15 with the specific and stated goal of guiding energy
16 supply management to purchase increasing amounts of
17 power in periods with short positions. This is intended
18 to limit the possibility of being short during periods
19 of peak demand and peak pricing. This revised policy
20 imposes power hedge percentage limits that are applied
21 independently to each side of the system, varying by
22 quarter, and escalating as the time to delivery of power
23 approaches. The most relevant requirement in relation to
24 the Company's NPC forecast is the requirement that
25 positions be hedged at a level where, on average, a

1 minimum of 75 percent of each month's largest generation
2 deficit is hedged in the first quarter of the future
3 (e.g., in December 2024 this would apply to the first
4 quarter of 2025).

5 **Q. In its original form, is the NPC forecast in compliance**
6 **with the Company's power hedging requirements?**

7 A. No. Aurora is a forward-looking, optimized,
8 deterministic dispatch model with no knowledge of the
9 Company's hedging requirements or how they evolve over
10 time. While some quarters may be in compliance without
11 this modeling improvement, that is coincidental, not an
12 indication that the model intentionally satisfies the
13 requirements imposed by the Company's risk management
14 policy.

15 **Q. What change was made to align the NPC forecast with the**
16 **Company's power hedging requirements?**

17 A. To reflect the fact that the Company will eventually
18 need to hedge each quarter at a minimum average of 75
19 percent, additional short-term firm transactions are
20 calculated, in quarterly 25 MW energy blocks of heavy or
21 light load hour products, and loaded into the model to
22 ensure that the quarterly average hedge ratio in the
23 peak hour of each month satisfies the policy-dictated
24 minimum requirements for the first quarter. In that way,
25 the inputs to the model are created in a manner which

1 recognizes that all four quarters in the NPC test period
2 will eventually be the first quarter in actual
3 operations and the Company will need to execute forward
4 transactions to satisfy its hedging policy requirements.

5 **Q. Does this change conform to the realities of actual**
6 **operations?**

7 A. Yes. As noted above, each month in the NPC test period
8 will eventually be part of a quarter that needs to be
9 hedged at a minimum average of 75 percent in actual
10 operations. However, these hedges are based on
11 forecasted prices, and to the extent that actual prices
12 differ from the forecasted prices, the cost of hedges
13 will be different in actual NPC; this concept holds true
14 for the entire NPC forecast.

15 **Q. Are these simulated hedge volumes subject to the DA/RT**
16 **price component?**

17 A. No. The prices used in the DA/RT price component are
18 created in recognition of the fact that, in actual
19 operations, the Company purchases at prices above the
20 OFPC and sells at prices below the OFPC in the spot
21 market (i.e., the day-ahead and real-time trading
22 horizons); and Aurora's optimization is fundamentally a
23 spot market simulation. Because this modeling update is
24 intended to simulate forward transactions, the prices
25 for the simulated hedges are added to the model with no

1 price adjustment. This is reflective of the Company's
2 transaction history, which indicates that forward hedges
3 are executed at or about the prevailing market price at
4 the time of execution, on average.

5 **Q. Why was no change made to the NPC forecast for the**
6 **Company's gas hedging requirements?**

7 A. Because such a change would have no impact to the NPC
8 forecast. Aurora does not physically balance the gas
9 system, and the impact of gas hedges consists entirely
10 of the mark-to-market ("MTM") value of those hedges.
11 Were the Company to simulate gas purchases at expected
12 market prices (i.e., the OFPC), they would show no MTM
13 impact and additionally, the associated gas volumes are
14 not modeled in Aurora, so there would be no change to
15 the NPC forecast.

16 **Q. Please quantify the NPC impact of this modeling**
17 **improvement.**

18 A. The NPC impact of this adjustment is an increase of \$0.67
19 million.

20 **E. Market Sales Capacity Limits**

21 **Q. What are market sales capacity limits?**

22 A. Market sales capacity limits refer to the amount of
23 energy that other market counterparties are willing to
24 purchase in aggregate from the Company. More
25 specifically, market capacity limits represent a

1 threshold above which no one else can be found in the
2 bilateral electricity markets to take the Company's
3 energy at or above the Company's cost of producing that
4 energy.

5 **Q. Please explain what a liquid market is in the industry**
6 **of today.**

7 A. From the perspective of market sales, a liquid market is
8 a market where the Company can find a buyer to take its
9 excess energy whenever the prevailing market price is at
10 or above the Company's cost of production, regardless of
11 hour or day.

12 **Q. Please explain why Aurora requires sales market capacity**
13 **limits.**

14 A. Like GRID before it, Aurora operates with perfect
15 foresight and assumes near unlimited market depth and
16 full liquidity for the markets in which the Company makes
17 off-system sales, unless informed otherwise. Aurora
18 would therefore allow unrealistic off-system sales at
19 every market at any time of the day or night—an
20 assumption that is very different from the Company's
21 actual, historical experience. The market capacity
22 limits inform Aurora of the limits on the depth of the
23 markets being modeled, thereby forcing Aurora to respect
24 those limits during the execution of its optimization
25 algorithm.

1 **Q. Is the Company proposing to make changes to the market**
2 **sales capacity limits calculation?**

3 A. Yes. With the inclusion of simulated hedge volumes in
4 the NPC forecast, the Company has removed volumes
5 related to hedges from its market sales capacity limits
6 calculation. Furthermore, the Company is applying the
7 market sales capacity limits to all market sales hubs
8 within Aurora, inclusive of the Palo Verde and Mid-
9 Columbia hubs, which did not have market capacity limits
10 in the 2021 GRC.

11 **Q. Why is the Company proposing to remove hedge volumes**
12 **from its market sales capacity limits calculation?**

13 A. Under the previous method, market sales capacity limits
14 were first calculated using historical sales volumes
15 inclusive of sales hedge volumes. Then, second, these
16 limits were reduced by executed sales hedge volumes for
17 the NPC test period, in order to provide for a realistic
18 modeled estimate of spot market sales volumes (i.e.,
19 sales in the day-ahead and real-time trading horizons)
20 plus *yet-to-be-executed* sales hedge volumes in the NPC
21 forecast. However, since the NPC forecast is now fully
22 hedged with simulated hedge volumes from the "Hedging
23 Requirement" modeling update discussed above, the
24 modeled market sales in the NPC forecast now represent
25 only spot market sales. For this reason, the market sales

1 capacity limits calculation now includes only spot
2 market sales volumes (i.e., excludes all hedge volumes)
3 in its calculation.

4 **Q. Why is the Company proposing to apply the market sales**
5 **capacity limits to the Palo Verde and Mid-Columbia hubs?**

6 A. As demonstrated in Confidential Figure 'Market Caps'
7 below, the volume of Company spot market sales has been
8 in a declining trend over the past five years.
9 Furthermore, and additionally, trading hubs in the spot
10 market are no longer as liquid as they used to be; as
11 demonstrated by the increased risk of energy shortfalls
12 across the region, specifically "the risk of resource
13 shortfalls during extreme summer weather conditions
14 after 2024,"¹⁵ as identified by the North American
15 Electric Reliability Corporation ("NERC").


16 **Q. How have the Company's spot market sales volumes been**
17 **decreasing over time?**

18 A. As can be seen in Confidential Figure 'Market Caps'
19 below, the Company has experienced a declining trend in
20 spot market sales volumes since 2018. After removing the
21 hedge volumes from the market sales capacity limits
22 calculation, in addition to applying the limits to sales

¹⁵ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, *2023 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* at 24 (Dec. 2023) (available at [https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC LTR A 2023.pdf](https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC%20LTR%20A%202023.pdf)) (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

1 at the Palo Verde ("PV") and Mid-Columbia ("Mid-C")
2 power trading hubs, the forecast volumes are much closer
3 to actuals¹⁶ as compared to the prior calculation
4 methodology¹⁷ which produces demonstrably unreasonable
5 and substantially inaccurate (high) levels of spot
6 market sales volumes; all illustrated in Confidential
7 Figure 'Market Caps' below.

Confidential Figure Market Caps



¹⁶ Confidential Figure 'Market Caps', column "Forecast 2025 Sales".

¹⁷ Confidential Figure 'Market Caps', column "Hedge Volumes and no PV/Mid-C Limits".


1 **Q. What are the drivers behind this decrease in spot market**
2 **sales volumes?**

3 A. Coal supply challenges, increased regulation reserve
4 requirements and the energy imbalance market ("EIM") are
5 three of the drivers for this decreasing trend in spot
6 market sales volumes.

7 **Q. How do regulation reserves contribute to the decrease in**
8 **spot market sales volumes?**

9 A. As entities across the region integrate ever increasing
10 numbers of variable renewable resources into their
11 portfolio, their regulation reserve obligations
12 increase. This relationship is illustrated in Figure
13 'Regulation Reserves'. As these reserve obligations
14 increase, excess supply is diminished. This reduction in
15 excess supply will naturally result in lower sales in
16 the spot markets. The trend whereby variable renewable
17 resources occupy a larger portion of entities'
18 portfolios over time is one that will continue to
19 increase well into and past 2025 due to various federal
20 and state regulations.

Figure Regulation Reserves



1 **Q. Are the regulation reserve numbers in Figure 'Regulation**
2 **Reserves' representative of the Company's balancing**
3 **authority reliability regulation reserve requirements?**

4 A. No. These numbers are the EIM's calculation of
5 regulation reserves using errors in load, wind and solar
6 forecasts made approximately 45 minutes before the
7 operating moment ("real-time") as compared to forecasts
8 made approximately 10 minutes before real-time. The
9 Company's regulation reserve requirements, subject to
10 NERC standards and represented in the IRP's flexible
11 reserve study, are calculated from errors in load, wind,
12 solar and other non-dispatchable generation forecasts
13 made approximately 107 minutes before real-time as

1 compared to actuals (i.e., 0 minutes before real-time).
2 As such, the trend is comparable but not the magnitude.

3 **Q. How does the EIM contribute to diminishing excess**
4 **supply?**

5 A. With the emergence of the EIM, which now serves 80
6 percent¹⁸ of the demand for electricity in the western
7 interconnection, EIM entities face additional
8 opportunity costs that must be contemplated in the spot
9 market timeframes. If an EIM entity finds itself with
10 excess supply and the expected price in the EIM is
11 greater than the prevailing price in the spot markets,
12 then the entity may forego selling their excess supply
13 into the spot markets and instead set that excess supply
14 aside for sale in the EIM. This naturally reduces sales
15 in the spot markets.

16 **Q. Is the Company's experience unique?**

17 A. No. Looking at Figure 'MidC Volumes' and Figure 'PV
18 Volumes' below, HLH volumes at the Mid-Columbia and Palo
19 Verde power market hubs have been decreasing since 2018.
20 This trend along with the discussion above supports the
21 position that the Mid-Columbia and Palo Verde trading
22 hubs are no longer as liquid as they used to be.

¹⁸ <https://www.caiso.com/about/Pages/Blog/Posts/Evolution-of-the-WEIM.aspx>.

Figure MidC Volumes





Figure PV Volumes



- 1 Q. What is the NPC impact of this modeling update?
- 2 A. Removing hedge volumes from the market sales capacity
- 3 limits calculation, as well as applying limits to the

1 Mid-Columbia and Palo Verde sales hubs, result in a NPC
2 increase of \$84 million.

3 **Q. Has the Company done any other tests to prove that market**
4 **capacity limits are needed at the Mid-C and PV trading**
5 **hubs?**

6 A. Yes. The Company used the Aurora validation 2020
7 backcast model (referenced in Section VI above) as a
8 starting point for testing. The Company then fixed (set
9 as static and known in the model) all 2020 historical
10 sales volumes with the exception of real-time sales
11 volumes (i.e., from hedge volumes to day-ahead sales
12 volumes) and then ran the model to observe the in-model
13 (modeled) system balancing sales, which should be
14 representative of 2020 historical real-time sales
15 volumes, given the aforementioned fixing of all other
16 sales volumes.

17 **Q. Please explain this simulation of real-time sales**
18 **volumes in further detail.**

19 A. With modeled system balancing sales as a proxy for 2020
20 historical real-time sales there was a need to adjust
21 the DA/RT price component to only account for historical
22 real-time transactions. Furthermore, the DA/RT volume
23 component was adjusted to remove the inferred daily, 25
24 MW increment block products that represented products

1 from day-ahead trading. Lastly, the market capacity
2 limits were removed in order to assess their impact.


3 **Q. How do the modeled real-time sales compare with the**
4 **actual, historical real-time sales?**

5 A. The below Table 'RT Sales' and Figure 'RT Sales' shows
6 a comparison between modeled real-time sales and
7 historical real-time sales at the Mid-C and PV trading
8 hubs.

Table RT Sales

Real-Time Sales (MWh)		
	Actual	Modeled
Mid-Columbia	58,622	610,866
Palo Verde	26,432	175,257

Figure RT Sales



9 As can be seen from Table 'RT Sales' and Figure 'RT
10 Sales', modeled real-time sales at the Mid-C and PV
11 trading hubs are greater than historical real time sales

1 by factors of 10 and 7 respectively. This demonstrates
2 that Aurora, like GRID before it, over-optimizes system
3 balancing sales. This over-optimization and the
4 consequent overstatement of wholesale sales revenue, as
5 exemplified best in the recent ECAM,¹⁹ necessitates
6 application of market capacity limits to all trading
7 hubs, inclusive of Mid-C and PV.

8 **Q. Do the increased modeled real time sales reflect**
9 **increased market depth?**

10 A. No. Please refer to Confidential Figure 'Market Caps'
11 above. The modeled real-time sales from this test
12 implies market depth that is contrary to the Company's
13 recent experience.

14 **VIII. 2023 WEATHER NORMALIZED LOAD**

15 **Q. What is the impact to NPC of adjusting the forecast to**
16 **incorporate 2023 weather normalized load?**

17 A. Moving from a 2025 load forecast to 2023 weather
18 normalized load to set expectations for the 2025 NPC
19 test period produces NPC of \$2.382 billion on a total-
20 Company basis and \$136.7 million, or \$39.34/MWh, on an
21 Idaho-allocated basis. On a \$/MWh basis this lowers NPC
22 by 1.6 percent, relative to the NPC forecast that uses
23 2025 expected load.

¹⁹ *In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power Requesting Approval of \$62.4 Million ECAM Deferral, Case No. PAC-E-24-05, Direct Testimony of Jack Painter, p. 14.*

1 **Q. Please summarize this NPC proposal section of your**
2 **direct testimony.**

3 A. On an Idaho-allocated basis, the Company's NPC as
4 modeled for the NPC test period in this case have
5 increased by \$14.80/MWh, or 60 percent, from the 2021
6 GRC forecast of \$24.54/MWh to the current weather
7 normalized GRC forecast of \$39.34/MWh. This increase is
8 driven by: 1) the NPC under-forecast in the 2021 GRC; 2)
9 increases in purchased power and natural gas fuel
10 expense that result from increased power and natural gas
11 commodity prices, a reduction in generation due to the
12 WA-GHG program, the expectation of lower hydroelectric
13 generation, and coal supply challenges.

14 **IX. NPC RECOVERY**

15 **Q. What is the purpose of this NPC recovery section?**

16 A. The Company is proposing to update the sharing band of
17 the energy cost adjustment mechanism (ECAM) because the
18 current structure is outdated, and the continued under-
19 forecast of NPC contributes to the significant financial
20 risks currently faced by utilities. My testimony
21 presents the Company's proposal to modify the ECAM
22 sharing band for 95 percent of NPC variances to be passed
23 through the mechanism. The remaining five percent of NPC
24 variances would remain outside the mechanism (95/5
25 sharing band). In addition to the outdated sharing band

1 of the ECAM - due to changes in the regional energy
2 landscape - the Company's planned entry into a complete
3 organized market - the California Independent System
4 Operator (CAISO) Extended Day Ahead Market (EDAM) -
5 further evidences the need for an update to the current
6 sharing band.

7 **Q. Please explain the current ECAM structure as it relates**
8 **to the sharing band.**

9 A. Commission Order No. 30904²⁰ authorized the Company to
10 implement an ECAM, a mechanism to recover the
11 differences between actual NPC and base NPC in rates.
12 The difference between base and actual ECAM costs per
13 kWh, both multiplied by the Company's actual retail load
14 in Idaho, is the amount eligible for sharing under the
15 ECAM. The current ECAM includes a 90/10 percent sharing
16 band, meaning 90 percent of the NPC differential
17 (variance) is either refunded to or paid by customers
18 and the Company retains or absorbs the other 10 percent
19 (90/10 sharing band).

20 **Q. Why is the structure of the ECAM outdated?**

21 A. Energy policies and their associated impacts to power
22 costs, and the wider electric industry, in the West have
23 changed significantly in the past decade, however, the

²⁰ *In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Approval of an Energy Cost Adjustment Mechanism (ECAM)*. Case No. PAC-E-08-08. Order No. 30904 (Sept. 29, 2009).

1 sharing band in Idaho that supports the recovery of
2 Company NPC has not changed concurrently - and has been
3 static since 2009. Since the turn of the century there
4 has been a significant decrease in dispatchable
5 generation across the Western United States and
6 correspondingly, a significant increase in optimization
7 and dispatch efficiencies that are and will be realized
8 through participation in organized markets.

9 It is vital for ratemaking policies to move forward
10 with the state of the industry. The increased volatility
11 introduced to NPC, since 2009, by the significant shift
12 to renewable resources across the Western United States
13 remains unaddressed through reform of the ECAM and has
14 had a material impact on the Company's financial health.
15 Furthermore, the volatility of both actual natural gas
16 fuel prices and market power prices, since 2009, exhibit
17 substantial deviation from the assumptions used to
18 forecast NPC and from the conditions that existed in
19 2009 because of the aforementioned changes in resource
20 mix across the Western United States. Additionally, the
21 short-term volatility caused by extreme weather events
22 that increase market and gas prices substantially
23 impacts these NPC variances, relative to conditions in
24 2009 which were markedly more predictable.

1 Lastly, the Company's commitment to join the EDAM
2 is a tremendous change, one that will drive NPC
3 considerably lower than would otherwise be possible and
4 demonstrates that the Company is managing its NPC to the
5 best of its ability and following best practices within
6 the industry. These changes now warrant the Company's
7 proposal to update the sharing band.

8 **Q. Is this an attempt by the Company to shift NPC risk from**
9 **the Company to customers?**

10 A. No. This is about appropriately situating the risk. In
11 the past, circa 2009, when demand service relied on base
12 load coal resources and some dispatchable natural gas
13 resources to follow load, NPC could be more easily
14 predicted because of long term fixed price coal
15 contracts. Most of the NPC variances were less
16 significant and caused by weather's impact on load,
17 along with smaller fluctuations in markets prices. Under
18 those circumstances, when generation across the Western
19 Electricity Coordinating Council area ("WECC") was more
20 predictable, it may have been appropriate for the
21 Company to carry the current risk balance of NPC
22 variances. However, today's regional load service
23 focuses more on net load, or load less renewable
24 generation. The costs associated with this type of load
25 service are much harder to predict and also increases

1 costs in times of market scarcity. For example, when
2 solar under performs in a region and load increases above
3 expectations this can reduce liquidity in the market and
4 drive power prices extremely high for all utilities, as
5 many buyers are looking to either replace that lost solar
6 energy or cover the unexpected load increase. Inversely,
7 when solar is over performing and load decreases below
8 expectations power prices can fall, but only slightly,
9 for all utilities, and there is less opportunity to make
10 a margin on excess energy. Apart from making NPC much
11 harder to predict, this asymmetry in market price
12 responses creates a NPC under-forecast bias in the ECAM
13 differential that leads to persistent under forecasts of
14 NPC as discussed and illustrated in further detail
15 below.

16 The Company has continued to reliably serve
17 customers as market conditions and load service has
18 changed over the years, even in times when the cost to
19 serve load exceeds the revenue collected from customers.
20 It is important to note that the Company does not earn
21 a return (profit) on NPC; the Company only includes costs
22 that have already been incurred in rates in the ECAM. As
23 the Company continues to adapt to the state of the
24 industry it is imperative that the regulatory structure
25 of NPC recovery is updated to adapt concurrently. This


1 will help support the financial health of the Company by
2 attracting the capital necessary to continue to reliably
3 serve customers and invest in the resources necessary to
4 meet reliable load service.

5 **Q. Please explain how the asymmetry in market price**
6 **responses creates a NPC under-forecast bias in the ECAM**
7 **differential.**

8 A. As an illustrative example, Figure 'Regional Supply
9 Stack' below depicts a proxy supply curve (with
10 inelastic demand) based on actual load, wind, and solar
11 data within the West during the summer of 2022, scaled
12 to Rocky Mountain Power load.

13 In this illustrative example, because of the
14 asymmetry of regional market price response, a 500 MWh
15 *increase* in net load (load less wind less solar) results
16 in a \$108/MWh increase in market price whereas an
17 identical 500 MWh *decrease* in net load results in only
18 a \$39/MWh decrease to market price.

Figure Regional Supply Stack



1 Because NPC move in proportion to regional market
2 prices, and continuing with the illustrative example
3 provided above, we observe that an unexpected increase
4 in net load will increase NPC by an amount far greater
5 than the decrease in NPC observed because of an identical
6 and opposite unexpected decrease in net load.

7 This asymmetrical response biases the NPC forecast
8 persistently downwards such that attempts to accurately
9 forecast NPC will probabilistically result in actual NPC
10 being greater than forecast NPC and consequently,
11 persistent under-forecast of NPC which flows through the

1 sharing band to the persistent detriment of the Company
2 as evidenced in further detail below.

3 **Q. Please summarize the remainder of this NPC Recovery**
4 **section.**

5 A. Below, I provide:

- 6 • An overview of the shift in resource mix across the
7 Western United States since the sharing band was
8 established in 2009 and how that impacts the
9 volatility of power costs;
- 10 • Next, I discuss the EDAM at a high level and how NPC
11 are handled by utilities in the Company's other
12 jurisdictions;
- 13 • Additionally, I discuss how the current structure of
14 the ECAM has impacted the Company's finances; and
- 15 • Finally, I describe how the NPC forecast set in
16 regulatory proceedings have no bearing on the
17 Company's incurred NPC, and I describe how NPC
18 variances are disconnected from the reality of power
19 system operations.

20 **Q. Are there any other Company witnesses providing**
21 **testimony on this NPC Recovery topic?**

22 A. Yes, Company witness John Tsoukalis from The Brattle
23 Group is providing testimony on the mechanics of the
24 EDAM, how it provides efficient outcomes and customer
25 benefits, and how these results impact the ECAM. He
26 additionally provides information on the current state
27 of the industry with regards to the structure of other
28 NPC true-up mechanisms, like the ECAM.

1 **A. Region-Wide change in Generation Resources**

2 **Q. How has dispatchable energy and demand changed within**
3 **the WECC since the implementation of the current ECAM**
4 **sharing band?**

5 A. From 2009 to 2022, dependable, dispatchable capacity,
6 which includes coal and natural gas, has been on a
7 declining trend and has decreased significantly overall.
8 As shown in Table 'Summer Megawatts' below, total summer
9 dispatchable capacity in the states comprising the
10 WECC has decreased from approximately 122,000 megawatts
11 ("MW") to 110,000 MW, or 10 percent. On the other side
12 of the equation, summer peak demand is on an upward
13 trajectory. As shown in Table 'Summer Megawatts' below,
14 peak demand has steadily increased between 2009 and 2022
15 from approximately 134,000 MW to 160,000 MW, or 19
16 percent.

Table Summer Megawatts


Year	Summer Dispatchable Capacity (MW)	Summer Peak Load (MW)
2009	121,945	134,477
2010	123,997	135,000
2011	125,133	133,100
2012	124,332	141,300
2013	123,450	142,200
2014	122,073	145,400
2015	121,374	150,200
2016	120,669	146,700
2017	117,709	150,800
2018	115,979	151,100
2019	112,249	148,000
2020	110,590	151,800
2021	110,504	152,700
2022	109,998	160,200

1 **Q. Why is this shift in dispatchable capacity and demand**
2 **within the WECC important to the ECAM?**

3 A. The ECAM operates as a mechanism for the Company to
4 refund or collect from customers a measure of normal
5 power cost variances incurred under the intent to
6 incentivize prudent decisions. Because of the
7 significant shift of both dispatchable capacity and
8 demand, power cost variances today are no longer normal,
9 relative to the norms of 2009 when the current ECAM
10 sharing band was established – and therefore, prudently
11 incurred costs are not being recovered. Additionally,
12 this significant shift in dispatchable capacity and
13 demand within the WECC has not only impacted the Company,
14 but all utilities in the West, compounding the problem
15 further by impacting utilities that the Company

1 transacts with and competes with for market purchases.
2 Figure 'Capacity as % of Demand' below visually
3 illustrates the shift in the states comprising the WECC
4 where dispatchable capacity has steadily decreased in
5 absolute terms (MW) and decreased as a percentage of
6 annual peak demand. Shortly after the current ECAM
7 sharing band was established in 2009, summer
8 dispatchable capacity in 2011 was rated at 94 percent of
9 summer peak demand in 2011. In 2022, dispatchable
10 capacity was much lower, rated at 69 percent of peak
11 demand.


Figure Capacity as % of Demand



1 Q. Has the demand during summer peak hours changed?

2 A. Yes, as referenced above. Between 2009 and 2022, the
3 greatest shift in demand has been during summer peak
4 hours (June through September). Figure 'Summer Peak
5 Demand' below visually depicts this increasing trend in
6 peak demand since the inception of the current ECAM
7 sharing band in 2009. In 2009, demand during summer peak
8 hours was approximately 134,000 MW and increased to
9 160,000 MW in 2022, or a 19 percent increase.

Figure Summer Peak Demand



10 Q. How has the increased demand during summer peak hours
11 impacted the ECAM?

12 A. In both 2021 and 2022, the Company experienced
13 heightened NPC due to extreme weather events during the
14 summer. The combination of increased demand,

1 particularly during the summer, and less dispatchable
2 capacity results in market scarcity and high prices and
3 the impact to NPC is intensified. June and July of 2021
4 alone accounted for 80 percent of the 2021 ECAM NPC
5 differential, while July, August and September of 2022
6 accounted for almost 50 percent of the total 2022 ECAM
7 differential. Both examples of these substantial NPC
8 variances are outside of the normal operating business
9 risk of the Company (wherein normal is based on
10 conditions in 2009).

11 **Q. Does the trend of decreasing dispatchable capacity and**
12 **increasing demand within the WECC necessitate and**
13 **warrant changes to the ECAM?**

14 A. Yes. The risks between the Company providing reliable
15 energy and the commodity-driven costs to serve its
16 variable customer demand are not the same as when the
17 ECAM sharing band was established in 2009; the industry
18 is now substantively different. With the loss of
19 dispatchable capacity and with increased demand across
20 the West and the associated consequential changes in the
21 market, the risk balance for power costs has been
22 fundamentally altered. The Company is proposing this
23 sharing band change as consistent with the fact that
24 power cost variances have increased significantly and
25 can no longer be considered normal relative to 2009 when

1 the current sharing band was implemented. Now, with this
2 increased variance and associated volatility, a sharing
3 percentage of five (95/5 sharing band) is now
4 appropriate.

5 **B. The EDAM - Utilities in Organized Markets**

6 **Q. The Company has announced its intention to join EDAM.**

7 **What is the EDAM?**

8 A. The EDAM is an initiative by the CAISO to extend
9 participation of a developed and organized day-ahead,
10 hour-ahead and intra-hour market to the region. The EDAM
11 will provide economically optimal and least-cost
12 resource schedules, commitment instructions, and other
13 core functions integral to organized markets across the
14 footprints of independent system operators ("ISO") and
15 regional transmission organizations ("RTO").
16 Operational control of resources will remain with the
17 Company, but the EDAM will allow for the co-optimization
18 of the Company's resources along with the resources of
19 other EDAM participants for substantially lowered NPC,
20 than otherwise achievable by the Company in isolation.
21 Company witness Tsoukalis provides much greater detail
22 on the EDAM and how system dispatch and economic
23 efficiencies will change.

1 **Q. Does participation in the EDAM create substantially**
2 **lowered NPC with minimal room for further decrease in**
3 **service of the Company's customers?**

4 A. Certainly. As a result of the decision to participate in
5 the EDAM, the economic operations of the Company's
6 system on a day-ahead, hour-ahead and intra-hour basis
7 will be optimized by an ISO whose mandate is to leverage
8 state of the art optimization software to minimize power
9 costs for all market participants. As discussed in the
10 testimony of Company witness Tsoukalis, the EDAM will
11 provide lower NPC than what the Company could achieve on
12 its own.

13 **Q. Does joining the EDAM impact the Company's ability to**
14 **accurately forecast NPC?**

15 A. Yes. As explained by Company witness Tsoukalis, NPC in
16 the EDAM is driven by conditions across the wider EDAM
17 footprint which extends into other utilities' systems.
18 Data on these conditions within other utilities' systems
19 will be unavailable to the Company due to their
20 confidential nature and therefore it will be extremely
21 difficult for any individual EDAM participant to
22 accurately forecast the NPC outcomes of the market.

23 **Q. What impact does an inaccurate forecast have on the ECAM?**

24 A. An inaccurate forecast can lead to significant NPC
25 variances (as evidenced in 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024

1 year-to-date) in the ECAM that will lead to costs
2 prudently incurred by the Company, to reliably serve
3 customer load, to either: (1) not be collected; or (2)
4 when actual costs are below forecast, to be retained by
5 the Company and not properly returned to customers.

6 **Q. How are utilities in organized markets treated in terms**
7 **of NPC variances in their power cost recovery**
8 **mechanisms?**

9 A. While this is covered in greater detail in the testimony
10 of Company witness Tsoukalis, it is important to note
11 that across the 35 states he reviewed that have
12 vertically integrated utilities, 26 have full
13 passthrough of NPC. Of the 20 remaining that participate
14 wholly or partially in an ISO/RTO type organized market
15 like the EDAM, only Missouri, Montana and Vermont do not
16 have complete pass through of net power costs.²¹

17 **Q. How do the power cost recovery mechanisms in the**
18 **Company's other jurisdictions operate?**

19 A. The Company operates in six different state
20 jurisdictions, each with a power cost recovery
21 mechanism. Utah and California do not have a sharing
22 band, which represent almost half of the Company's total
23 NPC. Wyoming has a sharing band. Oregon and Washington

²¹ Wisconsin is an exception among the 26 full passthrough states in that it employs a 2% deadband to modify the cost deviations from forecasts that are eligible for a full passthrough to customers.

1 have both dead bands and sharing bands. The Company has
2 or will be pursuing similar changes as proposed here, in
3 Oregon, Washington and Wyoming.

4 **Q. Is there anything unique about the Company's**
5 **jurisdictions?**

6 A. Yes. Only four²² states that currently participate in
7 EDAM like markets do not have a pass-through mechanism
8 that result in full recovery of prudently incurred
9 costs. With the implementation of the EDAM there would
10 be eight, and four of those eight would be states the
11 Company serves, so a comparison to states served by the
12 Company is not representative of the ratemaking approach
13 to recovery of NPC across the utility industry. The four
14 states within the Company's service area are therefore
15 outliers compared to the rest of the nation.

16 **C. Current ECAM Structure**

17 **Q. Is the current ECAM sharing band functioning in an**
18 **equitable fashion?**

19 A. Not at all. Based upon the current ECAM design, it would
20 be expected that over and under-forecasts of NPC along
21 with the attendant returns and collections would balance
22 each other out over the long term. Since the inception
23 of the ECAM in 2009, fourteen out of the fifteen years


²² Wisconsin is added here to the prior three of Missouri, Montana and Vermont.

1 have resulted in NPC under-forecasts and associated
2 under-collection of prudently incurred NPC due to the
3 current sharing band. However, it's expected that there
4 should be a more balanced distribution of under-forecast
5 and over-forecast of NPC. During this time frame, the
6 Company has seen a cumulative Idaho-allocated NPC under-
7 forecast of \$212 million, which translates to an
8 approximate \$21.2 million under-collection after
9 application of ten percent sharing. Table 'Sharing Band
10 NPC Impact' and Figure 'Sharing Band NPC Impact ' below
11 show the annual details of that under-forecast, and
12 vividly illustrates the opposite of long-term balance
13 between ratepayers and the Company.

Table Sharing Band NPC Impact

Year	NPC 10% Sharing - Over/ (Under) Forecast
Jul 09 - Dec 09	(\$12,150)
Dec 09 - Nov 10	(\$607,352)
Dec 10 - Nov 11	(\$1,856,902)
Dec 11 - Nov 12	(\$1,835,877)
Dec 12 - Nov 13	(\$979,139)
Dec 13 - Nov 14	(\$1,273,551)
Dec 14 - Nov 15	(\$926,976)
Dec 15 - Dec 16	\$105,107
2017	(\$211,347)
2018	(\$715,259)
2019	(\$1,027,552)
2020	(\$433,086)
2021	(\$1,304,085)
2022	(\$3,532,283)
2023	(\$6,587,473)
Total	(\$21,197,925)

Figure Sharing Band NPC Impact



1 **Q. Does the current 90/10 ECAM sharing band act as an**
 2 **appropriate incentive for the Company to manage costs**
 3 **effectively?**

4 A. No. As provided in more detail in the testimony of
 5 Company witness Tsoukalis, the Company has announced its
 6 intention to join the EDAM, which will create
 7 efficiencies that reduce NPC.²³ Once the EDAM is

²³ PacifiCorp to build on success of real-time energy market innovation as first to sign on to new Western day-ahead market, PACIFICORP (Dec. 8, 2022), <https://www.pacificorp.com/about/newsroom/news-releases/EDAM-innovative-efforts.html>.

1 operational in 2026, the sharing band at 90/10 is neither
2 effective or necessary to incentivize the Company to
3 manage its NPC because the EDAM will more efficiently
4 optimize the dispatch of resources to produce the least
5 cost outcome subject to constraints on the power system,
6 in a manner which goes above and beyond the Company's
7 capabilities in isolation. Lastly, the Company operates
8 its system on a least-cost basis on behalf of all its
9 customers in all six of its jurisdictions. As stated
10 above, two of these jurisdictions contain a full
11 passthrough of NPC and represent almost half of the
12 Company's total NPC and associated variance. Given that
13 the Company's participation in the EDAM will lower its
14 NPC to the lowest level attainable and given how it
15 operates its system across all six jurisdictions, the
16 current 90/10 sharing band is neither effective or
17 necessary to incentivize the Company to manage or reduce
18 its NPC.

19 **Q. How does this continued under-recovery of prudently**
20 **incurred NPC in Idaho impact the financial health of the**
21 **Company?**

22 A. Recovery of costs that are incurred to serve customers
23 are necessary to ensure that the Company has the
24 liquidity to fund its operations and to safely and
25 reliability serve its customers. To the extent that the

1 Company is continuously under recovering actual costs
2 that were prudently incurred to serve customers, it
3 places more pressure on the Company's liquidity and cash
4 reserves and may result in increased short-term and
5 long-term borrowing. This larger debt increases the
6 Company's leverage, which in turn increases the cost of
7 interest and places further pressure on the Company's
8 credit metrics and limits the Company's ability to
9 absorb increased prices for electricity and fuel to
10 serve its customers. To the extent that the Company has
11 an increased requirement to borrow money and higher
12 borrowing costs, these costs not only harm the health of
13 the utility but would be passed on to customers and can
14 ultimately result in a downgrade of its credit rating.
15 Company witness Nikki L. Kobliha discusses these topics
16 in more detail.

17 **D. The NPC Forecast**

18 **Q. Does the Company operate the system with these**
19 **regulatory NPC forecasts in mind?**

20 A. No, and it would be imprudent to do so. The Company's
21 energy supply management ("ESM") group, which optimizes
22 actual NPC in actual operations, does not operate with
23 the NPC forecast as a target. Company NPC forecasts
24 created during general rate cases, or other filings, are
25 only used to set NPC for ratemaking purposes, they are

1 not used or referred to in actual Company operations.
2 ESM is constantly - on a daily and more granular basis
3 - updating its forward prices, renewable resource
4 forecast, load forecast, etc. to manage NPC for a least-
5 cost outcome on behalf of all of its customers.

6 **Q. Can the Company improve the forecasting of model inputs**
7 **to capture all prudently incurred costs in the forecast?**

8 A. No, for several reasons. First, it is very difficult to
9 accurately forecast key NPC variables such as
10 intermittent renewable resources, extreme weather
11 events, and volatile market conditions for market power
12 prices and natural gas prices, especially when the
13 forecast is required to be normalized. Even minor
14 variables can have a significant impact on the Company's
15 large and complex power supply system. Second, as
16 mentioned above in further detail, the confidential
17 nature of other utilities' operational details will make
18 it extremely difficult for any individual EDAM
19 participant to accurately forecast the NPC outcomes of
20 the market, once the EDAM is implemented.

21 **X. CONCLUSION**

22 **Q. Please summarize your recommendation to the Commission.**

23 A. I recommend that the Commission: (1) adopt the proposed
24 base NPC for the NPC test period of \$136.7 million, or
25 \$39.34/MWh; and (2) approve a better solution for both

1 customers and the Company through modifying the sharing
2 band from a 90/10 percent Company/customer sharing
3 structure to a 95/5 percent Company/customer sharing
4 structure, which would ensure that the overwhelming
5 majority of prudently incurred NPC are appropriately
6 refunded to or collected from customers.

7 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

8 A. Yes.

Case No. PAC-E-24-04
Exhibit No. 23
Witness: Ramon J. Mitchell

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Ramon J. Mitchell
2025 NPC Report

May 2024

Exhibit 23

	Total	Jan-25	Feb-25	Mar-25	Apr-25	May-25	Jun-25	Jul-25	Aug-25	Sep-25	Oct-25	Nov-25	Dec-25
	\$												
Special Sales For Resale													
<i>Long Term Firm Sales</i>													
Black Hills	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Hurricane Sale	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Leaning Juniper Revenue	\$	292,041 \$	21,466 \$	19,348 \$	21,989 \$	14,723 \$	14,181 \$	13,437 \$	41,893 \$	46,324 \$	34,305 \$	23,624 \$	18,766 \$
PSCo_Sale	\$	13,182,454 \$	878,915 \$	812,880 \$	911,908 \$	663,180 \$	676,640 \$	868,951 \$	2,190,767 \$	2,214,464 \$	2,118,417 \$	687,033 \$	444,608 \$
Total Long Term Firm Sales	\$	13,474,495 \$	900,381 \$	832,228 \$	933,897 \$	677,903 \$	690,801 \$	882,388 \$	2,232,660 \$	2,280,788 \$	2,152,721 \$	710,656 \$	463,374 \$
<i>Short Term Firm Sales</i>													
Borah	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
COB	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Colorado	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Four Corners	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Idaho	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Mead	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Mid Columbia	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Mona	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
NOB	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Palo Verde	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
SP15	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Utah	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Washington	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
West Main	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Wyoming	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Total Short Term Firm Sales	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
<i>System Balancing Sales</i>													
COB	\$	53,708,780 \$	3,900,189 \$	3,229,620 \$	1,593,738 \$	1,701,032 \$	1,674,744 \$	2,126,186 \$	6,495,281 \$	8,425,507 \$	17,472,693 \$	2,454,677 \$	2,169,901 \$
Four Corners	\$	42,620,952 \$	5,026,368 \$	2,679,543 \$	2,378,502 \$	1,872,379 \$	1,093,437 \$	1,466,982 \$	4,330,703 \$	4,387,393 \$	9,640,334 \$	2,304,458 \$	3,371,222 \$
Mead	\$	476,137 \$	1,569,682 \$	5,101 \$	(574,020) \$	7,257 \$	13,725 \$	14,174 \$	7,692 \$	287,660 \$	4,285 \$	(922,317) \$	6,192 \$
Mid Columbia	\$	107,504,415 \$	21,519,395 \$	9,234,129 \$	5,265,866 \$	4,943,184 \$	1,860,054 \$	3,481,987 \$	10,542,246 \$	11,149,673 \$	7,410,264 \$	9,045,541 \$	8,460,382 \$
Mona	\$	16,077,006 \$	1,745,241 \$	1,600,242 \$	607,698 \$	566,574 \$	489,431 \$	696,902 \$	2,135,089 \$	2,530,603 \$	2,435,828 \$	732,765 \$	896,538 \$
NOB	\$	24,419,632 \$	3,002,149 \$	1,949,205 \$	1,413,816 \$	595,041 \$	532,798 \$	915,989 \$	4,245,440 \$	3,718,665 \$	1,473,505 \$	1,936,754 \$	1,952,254 \$
Palo Verde	\$	3,661,376 \$	295,147 \$	218,322 \$	50,769 \$	162,353 \$	147,882 \$	275,894 \$	567,030 \$	252,519 \$	767,216 \$	168,134 \$	273,889 \$
Trapped Energy	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$
Total System Balancing Sales	\$	248,468,299 \$	37,058,171 \$	18,916,161 \$	10,736,369 \$	9,847,820 \$	5,812,070 \$	8,978,113 \$	28,323,482 \$	30,752,020 \$	39,204,125 \$	15,720,013 \$	17,129,378 \$
Total Special Sales For Resale	\$	261,942,794 \$	37,958,552 \$	19,748,389 \$	11,670,266 \$	10,525,723 \$	6,502,870 \$	9,860,501 \$	30,556,142 \$	33,012,808 \$	41,356,846 \$	16,430,669 \$	17,592,752 \$

Other Generation Expense														
Blundell	\$ 5,548,069	\$ 426,194	\$ 262,756	\$ 516,438	\$ 518,878	\$ 295,633	\$ 492,113	\$ 481,258	\$ 506,730	\$ 491,247	\$ 508,536	\$ 506,047	\$ 542,238	
Blundell Bottoming Cycle	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Cedar Springs Wind II	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Dunlap I Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Ekola Flats Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Foote Creek I Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Foote Creek II Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Foote Creek III Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Foote Creek IV Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Glenrock Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Glenrock III Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Goodnoe Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
High Plains Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Leaning Juniper 1	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Marengo I Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Marengo II Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
McFadden Ridge Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Pryor Mountain Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Rolling Hills Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Seven Mile Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Seven Mile II Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Black Cap Solar	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
TB Flats Wind	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Rock Creek 1	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Rock Creek 2	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Rock River 1	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Integration Charge	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Total Other Generation Expense	\$ 5,548,069	\$ 426,194	\$ 262,756	\$ 516,438	\$ 518,878	\$ 295,633	\$ 492,113	\$ 481,258	\$ 506,730	\$ 491,247	\$ 508,536	\$ 506,047	\$ 542,238	
Net Power Cost	\$ 2,382,431,518	\$ 227,782,828	\$ 186,459,172	\$ 179,080,282	\$ 155,876,231	\$ 153,015,733	\$ 169,779,529	\$ 260,409,610	\$ 261,925,709	\$ 180,062,318	\$ 184,561,674	\$ 192,239,767	\$ 231,238,666	

Case No. PAC-E-24-04
Exhibit No. 24
Witness: Ramon J. Mitchell

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Ramon J. Mitchell

Aurora Validation

May 2024

Case No. PAC-E-24-04
Exhibit No. 25
Witness: Ramon J. Mitchell

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Ramon J. Mitchell

GRID Validation

May 2024

PacifiCorp GRID Validation NPC Report

12 months ended December 2021	Net Power Cost Analysis												
	01/21-12/21	Jan-21	Feb-21	Mar-21	Apr-21	May-21	Jun-21	Jul-21	Aug-21	Sep-21	Oct-21	Nov-21	Dec-21
	\$												
Special Sales For Resale													
Long Term Firm Sales													
Black Hills	7,532,217	735,605	518,304	481,626	474,039	433,303	595,216	737,682	733,885	726,030	643,094	706,458	746,974
Hurricane Sale	7,474	623	623	623	623	623	623	623	623	623	623	623	623
Leaning Juniper Revenue	105,254	7,601	7,384	9,260	5,355	4,684	6,043	14,266	16,102	10,939	7,961	6,724	8,936
Total Long Term Firm Sales	7,644,944	743,829	526,310	491,509	480,016	438,610	601,882	752,571	750,609	737,591	651,677	713,806	756,532
Short Term Firm Sales													
COB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Colorado	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Four Corners	21,354,660	3,522,890	2,974,080	3,095,370	1,977,600	1,958,400	1,977,600	-	-	-	1,971,460	1,905,800	1,971,460
Idaho	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mead	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mid Columbia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mona	7,750,000	1,277,800	1,202,400	1,345,800	338,000	325,000	338,000	-	-	-	985,000	953,000	985,000
NOB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Palo Verde	23,424,050	3,801,450	3,397,800	3,751,050	1,877,100	1,834,950	1,877,100	-	-	-	2,320,550	2,243,500	2,320,550
SP15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Utah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Washington	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
West Main	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wyoming	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Electric Swaps Sales	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
STF Trading Margin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
STF Index Trades	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Short Term Firm Sales	52,528,710	8,602,140	7,574,280	8,192,220	4,192,700	4,118,350	4,192,700	-	-	-	5,277,010	5,102,300	5,277,010
System Balancing Sales													
COB	29,651,914	3,332,735	2,357,695	1,898,661	1,035,907	1,048,019	1,760,434	2,240,054	2,231,577	2,100,152	3,520,890	3,894,654	4,231,137
Four Corners	39,704,708	3,303,662	3,448,953	2,009,392	1,765,495	1,113,323	640,820	6,174,110	5,483,323	5,864,117	3,124,169	3,104,731	3,672,614
Mead	32,132,100	4,416,682	3,016,064	1,456,847	948,624	1,219,709	1,728,477	2,297,774	3,511,400	3,195,582	3,421,497	3,562,410	3,357,034
Mid Columbia	44,001,091	3,786,533	803,610	528,753	2,209,685	1,371,110	2,444,523	6,701,841	7,389,368	7,080,796	4,269,499	4,171,327	3,244,045
Mona	19,491,384	1,825,358	547,950	233,377	784,958	995,043	1,432,010	2,289,681	2,400,963	5,463,776	1,324,799	1,133,092	1,060,377
NOB	6,320,250	-	14,777	588,915	784,080	22,523	47,501	1,252,386	1,907,945	654,601	26,842	11,956	1,008,724
Palo Verde	29,896,139	447,443	(13,689)	18,916	942,147	1,047,494	1,457,472	8,639,102	9,586,551	6,248,536	514,470	363,107	644,590
Trapped Energy	1,403	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,403	-
Total System Balancing Sales	201,198,989	17,112,413	10,175,360	6,734,861	8,470,896	6,817,222	9,511,238	29,594,947	32,511,127	30,607,559	16,202,167	16,242,679	17,218,521
Total Special Sales For Resale	261,372,642	26,458,383	18,275,950	15,418,589	13,143,612	11,374,182	14,305,819	30,347,518	33,261,736	31,345,151	22,130,854	22,058,785	23,252,063

Purchased Power & Net Interchange

Long Term Firm Purchases

APS Supplemental	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cedar Springs Wind	11,723,273	1,348,849	1,095,201	1,032,244	1,016,035	830,825	743,881	742,782	585,990	827,498	1,090,534	1,068,343	1,341,093	
Cedar Springs Wind III	8,908,095	1,025,294	832,067	784,236	772,110	631,271	565,348	564,366	445,200	628,830	828,668	811,823	1,018,881	
Combine Hills Wind	5,369,068	372,723	451,621	547,613	547,338	465,612	400,323	451,804	378,748	357,771	372,201	456,360	566,954	
Cove Mountain Solar	3,863,906	185,318	194,698	339,380	369,458	425,244	457,335	443,628	419,763	359,961	289,769	208,202	171,150	
Cove Mountain Solar II	343,571	28,534	28,675	28,713	28,701	28,534	28,701	28,624	28,624	28,609	28,624	28,609	28,624	
Deseret Purchase	33,416,953	2,792,679	2,843,532	2,655,765	2,590,568	2,494,076	2,584,049	2,979,142	2,979,142	2,947,847	2,946,543	2,667,501	2,936,112	
Douglas PUD Settlement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Eagle Mountain - UAMPS/UMPA	2,615,653	156,892	141,048	125,873	128,817	154,170	284,603	436,745	407,435	241,073	156,349	153,679	228,968	
Gemstate	1,717,824	143,152	143,152	143,152	143,152	143,152	143,152	143,152	143,152	143,152	143,152	143,152	143,152	
Hunter Solar	7,122,324	374,917	425,031	647,514	675,791	770,602	797,429	758,093	712,635	664,479	567,050	402,182	326,602	
Hurricane Purchase	165,480	13,790	13,790	13,790	13,790	13,790	13,790	13,790	13,790	13,790	13,790	13,790	13,790	
MagCorp	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
MagCorp Reserves	4,828,040	401,000	392,980	401,000	409,020	401,000	409,020	413,030	392,980	388,970	372,930	433,080	413,030	
Milican Solar	2,646,179	68,661	138,221	204,961	257,983	306,199	333,290	375,334	331,656	266,914	174,771	111,940	76,250	
Milford Solar	7,081,219	358,636	412,994	609,192	677,611	796,634	839,927	747,990	720,080	671,702	541,717	394,020	310,716	
Nucor	7,129,800	594,150	594,150	594,150	594,150	594,150	594,150	594,150	594,150	594,150	594,150	594,150	594,150	
Old Mill Solar	860,113	27,048	47,956	54,277	82,521	102,914	122,994	114,920	97,817	85,923	61,501	35,152	27,089	
Monsanto Reserves	19,999,999	1,666,667	1,666,667	1,666,667	1,666,667	1,666,667	1,666,667	1,666,667	1,666,667	1,666,667	1,666,667	1,666,667	1,666,667	
Pavant III Solar	2,693,193	112,247	140,376	230,428	259,149	310,804	322,999	305,697	292,254	260,260	214,705	137,146	107,129	
PGE Cove	154,785	12,899	12,899	12,899	12,899	12,899	12,899	12,899	12,899	12,899	12,899	12,899	12,899	
Prineville Solar	1,795,505	82,013	91,830	136,171	171,397	203,430	221,430	249,362	220,343	177,331	116,113	74,370	51,717	
Rock River Wind	3,949,010	647,624	502,957	528,679	435,960	284,843	262,621	181,185	193,222	262,771	490,382	158,766	-	
Sigurd Solar	2,905,571	-	-	-	-	-	23,671	660,236	605,234	565,052	458,516	322,228	270,634	
Small Purchases east	14,288	1,173	1,213	1,172	1,172	1,233	1,203	1,226	1,202	1,153	1,157	1,209	1,176	
Small Purchases west	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Soda Lake Geothermal	8,293,074	822,678	726,727	767,161	706,202	682,900	572,444	516,493	545,404	595,645	725,353	782,463	849,605	
Three Buttes Wind	20,662,796	2,790,663	1,806,921	2,135,557	1,618,738	1,425,615	1,202,984	807,052	950,561	1,186,424	1,734,559	2,352,376	2,651,346	
Top of the World Wind	40,686,138	5,436,527	3,612,759	4,244,151	3,270,658	2,907,364	2,399,806	1,720,417	1,872,120	2,296,841	3,513,203	4,491,632	4,920,662	
Wolverine Creek Wind	10,259,065	760,539	888,633	1,132,686	1,040,512	787,596	844,716	669,522	637,857	752,718	827,852	962,861	953,573	
Long Term Firm Purchases Total	209,204,921	20,224,670	17,206,098	19,037,430	17,490,397	16,441,523	15,849,432	15,598,304	15,248,923	15,998,428	17,943,153	18,484,599	19,681,966	

Storage & Exchange														
APS Exchange	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Black Hills CTs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cowlitz Swift	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSCo Exchange	5,400,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000
SCL State Line	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Storage & Exchange	5,400,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	450,000
Short Term Firm Purchases														
COB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Colorado	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Four Corners	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Idaho	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mead	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mid Columbia	14,768,640	1,621,000	1,556,160	1,750,680	-	-	1,216,800	2,912,000	2,912,000	2,800,000	-	-	-	-
Mona	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NOB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Palo Verde	678,500	247,250	207,000	224,250	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SP15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Utah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Washington	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
West Main	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wyoming	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
STF purchase subtotal	15,447,140	1,868,250	1,763,160	1,974,930	-	-	1,216,800	2,912,000	2,912,000	2,800,000	-	-	-	-
STF Electric Swaps	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
STF Index Trades	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Short Term Firm Purchases	15,447,140	1,868,250	1,763,160	1,974,930	-	-	1,216,800	2,912,000	2,912,000	2,800,000	-	-	-	-
System Balancing Purchases														
COB	14,400,284	285,501	1,261,483	1,663,711	654,627	1,723,681	1,485,126	2,446,485	1,421,069	490,529	859,093	269,382	1,839,598	
Four Corners	28,429,398	2,842,587	6,364,713	5,884,089	1,787,296	1,633,184	309,859	982,553	851,816	639,118	1,206,644	1,623,407	4,304,131	
Mead	6,543,189	387,353	928,141	318,456	278,541	379,237	379,454	940,549	439,285	462,393	719,567	378,270	931,941	
Mid Columbia	74,407,799	3,915,594	800,844	526,045	1,576,329	12,539,935	10,932,812	16,028,724	15,750,997	4,701,338	2,559,815	2,096,022	2,979,345	
Mona	8,713,073	947,711	193,196	1,362,896	221,788	747,258	66,919	835,818	503,604	356,076	1,169,571	1,267,020	1,041,216	
NOB	13,555,306	-	54,296	839,002	1,593,155	47,602	126,782	2,608,241	4,164,455	1,515,362	44,561	30,185	2,531,664	
Palo Verde	3,291,208	1,912,292	661,767	450,253	9,223	39,536	-	-	2,543	8,368	40,836	155,432	10,958	
EIM Imports/Exports	(59,250,810)	(3,445,870)	(3,105,010)	(6,863,178)	(6,863,641)	(7,467,599)	(3,035,622)	(7,434,719)	(7,740,230)	(4,243,730)	(2,826,239)	(2,722,603)	(3,502,369)	
Emergency Purchases	1,904,827	-	-	-	59,287	773,282	72,269	451,177	44,688	354,008	67,468	16,629	66,017	
Total System Balancing Purchases	91,994,275	6,845,168	7,159,431	4,181,275	(683,394)	10,416,116	10,337,600	16,858,829	15,438,227	4,283,462	3,841,317	3,113,745	10,202,500	
Total Purchased Power & Net Inter	684,465,594	54,522,699	52,939,007	56,214,017	49,722,320	59,905,551	62,001,457	72,223,924	68,960,363	54,468,388	50,326,914	48,270,848	54,910,106	

Wheeling & U. of F. Expense

Firm Wheeling	138,233,270	11,846,758	11,639,521	11,941,445	11,705,073	10,378,573	11,220,154	10,774,214	10,929,786	11,622,523	11,445,797	12,073,700	12,655,725
C&T EIM Admin fee	2,038,227	184,546	167,911	161,471	204,085	222,363	208,177	172,436	135,045	153,613	170,764	127,508	130,308
ST Firm & Non-Firm	43,029	13,235	3,760	3,011	434	-	1,277	4,049	2,190	1,585	2,870	7,203	3,415

Total Wheeling & U. of F. Expense	140,314,526	12,044,539	11,811,193	12,105,927	11,909,592	10,600,936	11,429,608	10,950,699	11,067,022	11,777,721	11,619,431	12,208,412	12,789,447
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Coal Fuel Burn Expense

Cholla	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Colstrip	15,944,066	1,758,488	1,502,306	1,491,743	1,294,454	719,529	1,130,158	1,544,746	1,651,646	1,436,935	951,206	1,010,123	1,452,732
Craig	19,150,970	1,915,459	1,662,106	1,728,134	1,467,240	701,480	1,373,402	1,586,878	1,847,263	1,720,488	1,695,960	1,624,924	1,827,637
Dave Johnston	55,761,755	5,545,315	5,097,111	4,666,077	3,972,961	4,406,396	4,179,117	4,600,831	5,049,983	4,544,176	5,008,160	3,899,963	4,791,664
Hayden	11,314,790	1,092,517	971,852	996,901	891,991	1,119,222	980,957	1,054,345	890,611	583,886	745,023	962,052	1,025,432
Hunter	119,361,523	11,752,962	9,868,586	8,782,962	6,001,455	7,541,139	9,746,152	11,280,364	11,214,492	10,620,817	10,346,073	11,107,035	11,099,486
Huntington	99,922,532	9,902,243	8,280,046	7,685,095	7,137,019	5,729,828	6,704,581	10,577,674	10,714,065	7,672,838	6,652,417	8,067,526	10,799,200
Jim Bridger	160,568,885	10,891,597	11,572,897	12,951,734	11,209,268	8,629,348	10,713,340	21,122,415	20,810,479	14,798,137	11,635,424	13,336,149	12,898,097
Naughton	75,457,447	7,037,257	6,059,344	6,209,946	5,907,535	4,795,131	5,900,533	6,659,412	6,855,070	6,691,583	6,915,264	6,264,483	6,161,889
Wyodak	29,019,449	2,571,408	2,513,652	2,811,880	2,503,324	2,778,487	2,190,116	2,725,396	2,562,642	2,392,560	2,402,957	2,007,981	1,559,048

Total Coal Fuel Burn Expense	586,501,418	52,467,246	47,527,899	47,324,471	40,385,246	36,420,561	42,918,356	61,152,062	61,596,250	50,461,421	46,352,485	48,280,236	51,615,184
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Gas Fuel Burn Expense

Chehalis	38,103,671	2,474,830	1,122,065	1,924,565	2,320,703	20,136	1,745,829	4,774,064	4,709,339	4,661,488	5,007,935	4,525,362	4,817,356
Current Creek	36,936,636	2,483,854	453,011	132,129	2,689,159	1,529,496	3,400,255	4,743,362	3,618,956	3,968,192	4,557,262	4,945,180	4,415,780
Gadsby	5,491,715	35,942	50,150	123,858	150,209	174,358	456,732	1,067,946	1,075,590	711,177	409,440	460,218	776,095
Gadsby CT	2,787,073	29,777	3,274	5,485	72,169	69,796	139,815	522,811	511,036	277,374	230,875	235,501	689,160
Hermiston	22,167,592	2,345,965	1,350,019	1,282,104	1,844,660	8,533	869,383	2,327,739	2,463,347	2,398,513	2,294,975	2,401,167	2,581,189
Lake Side 1	54,900,622	5,103,037	3,688,461	2,687,692	4,180,292	2,382,044	4,198,764	5,870,751	5,853,992	5,353,046	4,549,555	5,320,139	5,712,850
Lake Side 2	63,220,546	6,524,249	4,749,373	3,899,626	4,119,433	3,713,927	4,787,196	5,935,265	5,954,663	5,608,375	5,437,945	5,486,567	7,003,926
Naughton - Gas	20,317,381	2,531,859	2,433,992	1,963,691	593,083	1,074,098	1,226,797	1,988,607	1,826,395	1,191,663	1,313,676	1,403,712	2,769,808

Total Gas Fuel Burn	243,925,235	21,529,514	13,850,343	12,019,150	15,969,706	8,972,388	16,824,770	27,230,545	26,013,318	24,169,828	23,801,662	24,777,847	28,766,164
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Gas Physical	(416,723)	(79,114)	(57,965)	(24,301)	(25,945)	(23,006)	(23,393)	(50,730)	(49,843)	(45,141)	(37,288)	-	-
Gas Swaps	(19,937,668)	(4,536,928)	(3,311,210)	(1,238,993)	(534,300)	(308,760)	(399,300)	(2,547,968)	(2,611,285)	(2,249,700)	18,135	(364,800)	(1,852,560)
Clay Basin Gas Storage	(588,564)	(334,019)	(307,763)	(216,982)	52,242	52,242	52,242	52,242	52,242	52,242	52,242	2,850	(98,348)
Pipeline Reservation Fees	36,238,771	3,006,087	2,970,650	3,003,231	3,001,490	3,013,815	3,016,829	3,053,890	3,053,707	3,026,691	3,028,291	3,019,210	3,044,880

Total Gas Fuel Burn Expense	259,221,051	19,585,541	13,144,055	13,542,105	18,463,195	11,706,680	19,471,149	27,737,980	26,458,139	24,953,920	26,863,043	27,435,107	29,860,136
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Other Generation

Blundell	4,501,334	457,175	412,932	412,932	402,228	418,278	386,442	365,375	383,296	405,974	390,495	223,692	242,515
Blundell Bottoming Cycle	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Total Other Generation	4,501,334	457,175	412,932	412,932	402,228	418,278	386,442	365,375	383,296	405,974	390,495	223,692	242,515
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Net Power Cost	1,413,631,280	112,618,817	107,559,136	114,180,864	107,738,968	107,677,824	121,901,193	142,082,522	135,203,334	110,722,273	113,421,514	114,359,509	126,165,326
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REDACTED

Case No. PAC-E-24-04

Exhibit No. 26

Witness: Ramon J. Mitchell

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

REDACTED

Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Ramon J. Mitchell

Aurora Benchmark

May 2024

Results of the Aurora Benchmarking Study

The results of the benchmarking study show that Aurora simulated 2020 historical net power costs (NPC) at \$58.7 million less than actual NPC. Aurora estimated total company 2020 NPC to be \$1,453 million compared to actual 2020 costs of \$1,511 million, an under-forecast of 3.9 percent.

Confidential Table 1 illustrates a detailed comparison between the benchmarking study and 2020 Actual NPC. Long-term firm sales and long-term firm purchase dollars and megawatt-hours (MWh) are based on actual transactions. Hydroelectric generation and solar generation are based on actual generation. The variance between short-term firm and system balancing sales and purchases is driven by the fact that Aurora balances the system differently than the Company does in actual operations. More specifically, Aurora faces a different set of operational constraints compared to what the Company faces in real time. For example, market liquidity in the benchmarking study is predetermined based on market capacity limits that allow more sales transactions than the Company's historical experience.

It is important to note that the NPC forecast is designed with hourly average inputs. Given a certain set of hourly average input variables, Aurora applies its system balancing logic to meet load and wholesale obligations under the operational constraints assumed in the model. In actual operations, the Company faces a different set of real (moment-to-moment) system constraints, many of which are not able to be fully reflected in Aurora's modeling assumptions. Furthermore, Aurora is not able to forecast thermal dispatch in the same way that PacifiCorp dispatches its thermal plants in real time and Aurora's optimization of the system is perfect which means that after the optimization is complete no net savings can be further achieved by backing down one unit and ramping up another unit.

In actual operations, as a matter of prudence, PacifiCorp seeks to optimize the system. However, in reality, PacifiCorp faces a different set of constraints resulting from actual market conditions, and in real time, system dispatch will choose to balance the system using coal plants, gas plants and system balancing purchases and sales in an order that is feasible to current market conditions. The order of selection of coal plants, gas plants and system balancing purchase and sales results in differences in each resource category compared to the benchmarking study results. Consequently, and as shown in **Confidential Table 1** below, the coal and natural gas dispatch (on a MWh basis) in Aurora was approximately one percent more and two percent less than actuals, respectively.

Confidential Table 1 – Net Power Cost Differential Summary – Benchmark

[CONFIDENTIAL BEGINS]

Net Power Cost Differential Summary

Benchmark

Aurora

Actual

Difference

Difference %

	Aurora	Actual	Difference	Difference %
[REDACTED]				

Aurora

Actual

Difference

Difference %

	Aurora	Actual	Difference	Difference %
[REDACTED]				

[CONFIDENTIAL ENDS]

Conclusions


When actual data is used as inputs, Aurora produces 2020 NPC below the actual 2020 NPC and this is to be expected.

First, Aurora applies its system balancing logic with perfect foresight and perfect execution. That is to say, Aurora knows the future and operates the system with perfect efficiency in every hour. In reality, the future is uncertain, humans cannot know exactly at what level variable resources will be producing in a future hour and there will always be some inefficiency within a grouping

of individuals (people). In the context of NPC, this reality of the human experience deviates from the perfection inherent in Aurora and the associated perfectly-low Aurora NPC.

Second, there is an asymmetry in the response of market prices to changes in load and generation. As an illustrative example, **Figure 1** below shows a proxy supply/demand curve (with inelastic demand) based on actual load, wind, and solar data within the region. It is observed that because of the asymmetry of market price response, a 500 MWh increase in net load (load less wind less solar) results in a \$108 dollar per MWh (\$/MWh) increase in market price, whereas an identical 500 MWh decrease in net load results in only a \$39/MWh decrease to market price.

Figure 1



This asymmetrical response impacts actual operations because the net load forecasts, in reality, are uncertain (i.e., there is no perfect foresight). This uncertainty results in an equal chance of net load being higher or lower than forecasted. However, the impact to NPC is an asymmetric response wherein the actual NPC has a greater chance of being higher than the forecast NPC and consequently the forecast NPC is biased downwards relative to the actual NPC. This result is observed in this benchmarking study.

Case No. PAC-E-24-04
Exhibit No. 27
Witness: Ramon J. Mitchell

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Ramon J. Mitchell
General Electric Company - Effect of Temperature on Output

May 2024

General Electric Model 7F.04 Gas Turbine


Estimated Performance

Effect of Compressor Inlet Temperature on Output

Design Values Referenced on 104H6508 Rev - Sheet 1

Fuel: Gas

Mode: Base



	Units										
Compressor Inlet Temperature	F	-2.55	6.00	18.00	30.00	42.00	54.00	66.00	78.00	90.00	102.00
Output Ratio		1.09008	1.09008	1.09008	1.07666	1.04701	1.01476	0.97597	0.93401	0.88979	0.83877

Case No. PAC-E-24-04
Exhibit No. 28
Witness: Ramon J. Mitchell

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Ramon J. Mitchell
Siemens Energy AG - Effect of Temperature on Output

May 2024



Power Correction for Deviations in Compressor Inlet Temperature FOR REFERENCE PURPOSES ONLY

